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Uber and Lyft ride-hailing marketplaces use dynamic pricing, often called surge, to balance the supply of
available drivers with the demand for rides. We study pricing mechanisms for such marketplaces from the
perspective of drivers, presenting the theoretical foundation that has informed the design of Uber’s new addi-
tive driver surge mechanism. We present a dynamic stochastic model to capture the impact of surge pricing
on driver earnings and their strategies to maximize such earnings. In this setting, some time periods (surge)
are more valuable than others (non-surge), and so trips of different time lengths vary in the opportunity cost
they impose on drivers. First, we show that multiplicative surge, historically the standard on ride-hailing plat-
forms, is not incentive compatible in a dynamic setting. We then propose a structured, incentive-compatible
pricing mechanism. This closed-form mechanism has a simple form, and is well-approximated by Uber’s new
additive surge mechanism.
1. Introduction
Ride-hailing marketplaces like Uber, Lyft, and Didi match millions of riders and drivers
every day. A key component of these marketplaces is a surge (dynamic) pricing mechanism.
On the rider side of the market, surge pricing reduces the demand to match the level of
available drivers and maintains the reliability of the marketplace, cf., (Hall et al. 2015),
and so allocates the rides to the riders with the highest valuations. On the driver side,
surge encourages drivers to drive during certain hours and locations, as drivers earn more
during surge (Lu et al. 2018, Hall et al. 2017, Chen and Sheldon 2016). Castillo et al. (2017)
show that surge balances both sides of this spatial market by moderating the demand and
the density of available drivers, hence avoiding so called “Wild Goose Chase” equilibria in
which drivers spend much of their time on long distance pick ups. Due to these effects, surge
pricing – along with centralized matching technologies – is often considered the primary
reason that ride-sharing marketplaces outperform traditional taxi services on many metrics,
including driver utilization and overall welfare (Cramer and Krueger 2016, Buchholz 2017,
Ata et al. 2019).
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(a) Multiplicative surge heatmap. “1.6x” on the map
means that the standard fares for trips from the cor-
responding area are increased by 60%.
(b) Additive surge heatmap. “$7.8” on the map
means that $7.8 is added to the standard fares for
trips from the corresponding area.
Figure 1 Example driver surge heatmaps with multiplicative and additive surge, respectively. On Uber, drivers can
see a heatmap of surge when they are logged in but not on a trip. The heatmap is meant to guide drivers
to higher earning opportunities, signaling each location’s value to drivers (Lu et al. 2018). Structural
simplicity is essential to clearly communicate payments to drivers, and additive and multiplicative surge
represent the two simplest options.
However, variable pricing (across space and time) must be carefully designed, since it
can create incentives for “cherry-picking” and rejecting certain trip requests. Such behav-
ior increases earnings of strategic drivers at the expense of other drivers, who may then
disproportionately receive such trip requests after they are rejected by others, cf., (Cook
et al. 2018). It also reduces overall platform reliability, inconveniencing riders who may
have to wait longer before receiving a ride.
Uber recently revamped its driver surge mechanism to simplify such decisions, in an
attempt to improve the driver experience and making earnings more dependable (Uber
2019b). The main change is making surge “additive” instead of “multiplicative.” Under
multiplicative surge, the payout of the driver from a surged trip scales with the length
of the trip. In contrast, under additive surge, the surge component of the payout is
constant (independent of trip length), with some adjustment for very long trips (Uber
2019d). Figure 1 depicts the heat-map of surge on the driver app for each type of surge.
We show that this change directly addresses the issue that drivers who strategically reject
trip requests may earn more than drivers who do not, even as total payments remain the
same.
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Contributions
We consider the design of incentive compatible (IC) pricing mechanisms in the presence
of surge. Trips differ by their length τ ∈ R+, and the platform sets the payout w(τ) for
each trip in each world state (i.e., surge vs non-surge). Drivers decide which trip requests
σ⊆R+ to accept in each world state, in response to the payout function w.1 The technical
challenge is to design a IC pricing mechanism w, for which accepting all trips is an earning
maximizing strategy for drivers over a long horizon, i.e. where σ = (0,∞) in each world
state maximizes driver earnings.
We first study a continuous-time, infinite horizon single-state model, where there is
only one world state and trip requests arrive over time according to a stationary Poisson
process. We show that in this model, multiplicative pricing — where the payout of a trip is
proportional to the length of that trip — is incentive compatible. To obtain this result, we
show in Theorem 1 that the best response strategy of a driver to function w, to maximize
her earning, is a threshold strategy where she accepts all trips with payout rate w(τ)
τ
above
that threshold. Hence, an mechanism that equalizes the payout rate of all trips is incentive
compatible.
We then present a model where the world state stochastically transitions between surge
and non-surge states, with trip payments, distributions, and intensity varying between
states. In such a temporally dynamic system, completing a given trip affects a driver’s
earnings beyond just the length of the trip, i.e. imposes a future-time externality on the
driver that is a function of the trip length. The driver’s trip opportunity cost thus includes
both what occurs during a trip, and a continuation value. This externality implies that
multiplicative surge is not incentive compatible in the presence of surge (Theorem 2), in
contrast to the single-state model. Namely, drivers can benefit from rejecting long trips in
a non-surge state, and short trips in the surge state.
In our main result, Theorem 3, we propose a class of incentive compatible pricing func-
tions that are described as closed forms of the model primitives. The prices account for
the driver’s temporal externalities; e.g., during surge, short trips pay more per unit time
than do long trips.
1 Drivers’ level of sophistication and experience varies, cf. Cook et al. (2018). An IC mechanism aligns the incentives
of drivers to accept all trips, for any level of strategic response to pricing strategies.
Author: Driver Surge Pricing
4 Article submitted to ; manuscript no.
Finally, we consider additive and multiplicative surge in our dynamic model. Through
numerical simulations,2 we show that the new additive surge mechanism has desirable
incentive compatibility properties when compared to multiplicative surge. More specifically,
we observe that under additive surge, drivers may benefit only from rejecting a small
fraction of long trips, supporting the practical remedy that makes adjustments for certain
long trips (Uber 2019d).
To our knowledge, ours is the first ride-hailing pricing work to incorporate dynamic
(non-constant), stochastic demand and pricing. This component is essential to uncover
the way through which a particular trip imposes substantial temporal externalities on a
driver’s future earnings.
Related Work
We discussed some of the related work on surge pricing above. Here, we briefly review the
lines of research closest to ours. We refer the reader to a recent survey by Korolko et al.
(2018) for a broader overview of the growing literature on ride-hailing markets.
Driver spatio-temporal strategic behavior. Several works model strategic driver
behavior in a spatial network structure, and across time in a single-state. Ma et al. (2018)
develop spatially and temporally smooth prices that are welfare-optimal and incentive
compatible in a deterministic model. Their prices form a competitive equilibrium and are
the output of a linear program with integer solutions. We similarly seek to develop incen-
tive compatible pricing schemes, and both works broadly construct VCG-like prices that
account for driver opportunity costs. Our focus is on structural aspects (e.g. multiplicative
in trip length) in a non-deterministic model.
Bimpikis et al. (2016) show how the platform would price trips between locations, taking
into account strategic driver re-location decisions, in a single-state model with discrete
locations. They show that pricing trips based on the origin location substantially improves
surplus, as well as the benefits of “balanced” demand patterns. Besbes et al. (2018b)
consider a continuous state space setting and show how a platform may optimally set prices
across the space in reaction to a localized demand shock to encourage drivers to relocate;
their model has driver cost to re-locate, but no explicit time dimension. They find that
localized prices have a global impact, and, e.g., the optimal pricing solution incentivizes
2 Whenever possible, we fit the parameters of the Uber’s data.
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some drivers to move away from a demand shock. Afe`che et al. (2018) consider a two
state model with demand imbalances and compare platform levers such as limiting ride
requests and directing drivers to relocate, in a two-state fluid model with strategic drivers.
They upper-bound performance under these policies, and find that it may be optimal
for the platform to reject rider demand even in over-supplied areas, to encourage driver
movement. A similar insight is developed by Guda and Subramanian (2019). Finally, Yang
et al. (2018) analyze a mean-field system in which agents compete for a location-dependent,
time-varying resource, and decide when to leave a given location. They leverage structural
results — agents’ equilibrium strategies depend just on the current resource level and
number of agents — to numerically study driver decisions to relocate between locations as
a function of the platform commission structure.
Dynamic pricing in ride-sharing and service systems. There is a growing lit-
erature on queuing and service systems motivated in part by ride-sharing market. For
example, Besbes et al. (2018a) revisit the classic square root safety staffing rule in spatial
settings, cf., Bertsimas and van Ryzin (1991, 1993). Much of the focus of this line of work
is how pricing affects the arrival rate of (potentially heterogeneous) customers, and thus
the trade-off between the price and rate of customers served in maximizing revenue.
Banerjee et al. (2015) consider a network of queues in which long-lived drivers enter the
system based on their expected earnings but cannot reject specific trip requests. Under
their model, dynamic pricing cannot outperform the optimal static policy in terms of
throughput and revenue, but is more robust. Cachon et al. (2017) argue on the other hand
that surge pricing and payments are welfare increasing for all market participants when
drivers decide when to work. Similar in spirit to our work, Chen and Hu (2018) consider a
marketplace with forward-looking buyers and sellers who arrive sequentially and can wait
for better prices in the future. They develop strategy-proof prices whose variation over
time matches the participants’ expected utility loss incurred by waiting.
One of the most related to our work in modeling approach, Kamble (2018) studies how
a freelancer can maximize her long-term earnings with job-length-specific prices, balancing
on-job payments and utilization time. In his model, a freelancer sets her own prices for a
discrete number of jobs of different lengths and, with assumptions similar to our single-
state model, it is optimal for the freelancer to set the same price per hour for all jobs. We
further discuss the relationship of this work to our single-state model below.
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Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we formally
present our model. In Section 3, we formulate a driver’s best response strategy to affine
pricing functions in each model. In Section 4, we present incentive compatible pricing func-
tions for our surge model. Finally, in Section 5, we numerically compare the IC properties
of additive and multiplicative surge.
2. Model
We consider a large ride-hailing market with decoupled pricing, from the perspective a sin-
gle driver. This driver receives trip requests of various lengths, whose rate, distribution, and
payment are known to the driver but determined exogeneously to her decisions to accept
or decline requests. We do not consider spatial heterogeneity in our setting, to abstract
away the impact of location and focus on temporal opportunity cost and continuation value
based on a length of the trip.3
In this section, we first describe the primitives of our two models, a single-state model
(Section 2.1) and a dynamic model with surge pricing (Section 2.2). Then we describe the
driver’s strategy space and the platform’s pricing design challenge (Section 2.3).
2.1. Single-state model
We start with a model where there is a single world state, i.e. all distributions are constant
over time. Time is continuous and indexed by t. At each time t, the driver is either open,
or busy. While the driver is open, she receives job (trip) requests from riders according
to a Poisson process at rate λ, i.e., the time between requests is exponential with mean
1
λ
. Job lengths, denoted by τ , are drawn independently and identically from continuous
distribution F .
If the driver accepts a job request of length τ at time t (as discussed below), she receives
a payout of w(τ) at time t+ τ , at which time she becomes open again. If the request is not
accepted, the driver remains open. Note that our model of a trip is a simplification from
practice, where a given job has two components: the time it takes to pick-up the rider, and
the time while the rider is in the driver’s vehicle. To simplify the presentation, we combine
these two components into trip length. When these components are separated, the space
of driver strategies becomes richer, but results remain qualitatively the same.
3 We believe our insight can be extended to a spatial setting where the price can be decomposed to a time-based
component, based on the length of the trip, and a spatial component based on the destination of the trip. However,
this would be beyond the scope of this work, cf., Bimpikis et al. (2016).
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Pricing function w is assumed to be continuous and non-decreasing, and such that
the hourly payment as a function of the trip length is asymptotically bounded, ∃c :
lim infτ→∞
w(τ)
τ
≤ c.
2.2. Dynamic model with surge pricing
A model with fixed pricing and arrival rates of jobs is not a realistic representation of ride-
hailing platforms. In particular, rider demand (both in intensity and in distribution) may
vary substantially over time. To study how this dynamic nature affects driver decisions, we
consider a model with two states, i∈ {1,2}, where i= 2 denotes the surge state. (At a high
level, the surge state provides a higher earnings rate to the driver. The precise definition
of what distinguishes the surge state is presented in Section 3.2, after we formulate the
driver’s earnings rate in each state).
The world evolves stochastically between the two states, as a Continuous Time Markov
Chain (CTMC). When the world is in state i, the state changes to j according to a fixed
exponential clock that ticks at rate λi→j, independently of other randomness.
When open in state i, the driver receives job requests at rate λi with lengths τ ∼ Fi,
and collects payout according to payment function wi, which is presumed to have the same
properties as w in the single-state model. Note that the state of the world may change
while a driver is on trip. The driver receives payments according to the state of the world i
when she starts a trip. We will use w= {w1,w2} to denote the overall pricing mechanism.
2.3. Driver strategies and earnings
In our model, the driver can decide whether to accept the trip request, with no penalty.4
In the single-state model, let σ⊂R+ = (0,∞) denote the driver’s (deterministic) strategy,
where τ ∈ σ implies that a driver accepts job requests of length τ . In the dynamic model, the
driver follows deterministic policy σ= {σ1, σ2}, where σi ⊂R+ indicates the jobs she accepts
in state i. We assume that driver policies are measurable with respect to F (corresponding
Fi in dynamic model); additionally, for technical reasons, in the dynamic model we also
assume that σi consist of a union of open intervals, i.e. are open subsets of R+. When we
write equalities with policies σ, we mean equality up to changes of measure 0.
The driver is long-lived and aims to maximize her lifetime average hourly earnings on
the platform, including both open and busy times. Let R(w,σ, t) denote the (random) total
4 This assumption follows Uber’s current practice. We further discuss the driver’s information set below.
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earnings from jobs accepted from time 0 up to time t if she follows policy σ and the payout
function is w; see the appendix for a more formal definition. Then, the driver’s lifetime
earnings rate is
R(w,σ), lim inf t→∞
R(w,σ, t)
t
.
This earnings rate is a (deterministic) function of driver policy σ, pricing function w,
and the primitives. We can now define notions of an optimal driver policy and incentive
compatible pricing.
A driver policy σ∗ is optimal (best-response) with respect to pricing function w if it
maximizes the lifetime earnings rate of the driver among all policies: R(w,σ∗)≥R(w,σ),
for all valid policies σ (i.e. measurable with respect to F,Fi, with σi open sets). Then,
pricing function w is incentive compatible (IC) if accepting all job requests is optimal
with respect to w, i.e. σ = (0,∞) in the single-state model or σ = {(0,∞), (0,∞)} in
the dynamic model is optimal with respect to w. In other words, pricing function w is
incentive compatible if an earnings-maximizing driver (who knows all the primitives and
w) accepts every trip request. In Section 5, we also consider an approximate notion of
incentive compatible pricing, defined as the fraction of trips that are accepted under an
optimal driver policy with respect to a given pricing function.
Information structure. We assume that the platform reveals the total trip length to the
driver at the time of request, and that the driver can freely reject it without penalty. We
note that in current practice in ride-hailing markets, drivers often cannot see the rider’s
destination or the trip length until they pick up the rider (but they can reject a request
based on the pick-up time to the rider, without penalty). Some drivers call ahead to find
out the rider’s destination or even cancel the trip at the pick-up location, creating negative
experiences for both the rider and the driver.5 Our notion of incentive compatibility is
ex-post, implying that drivers would accept all trips, even if the trip length is not revealed,
and so this setting from practice is covered as well.
Decoupled pricing. Our setting is decoupled: rider and driver prices are determined sep-
arately. Namely, changes in the driver payout function and decisions do not change the
5 We note that destination discrimination is against Uber’s guidelines and could lead to deactivation (Uber 2019a).
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trip request rate or the distribution of the trips. This modeling assumption follows the cur-
rent practice (Uber 2019e) and furthermore allows us to focus on the drivers’ perspective,
without further complicating the analysis.6
3. Driver Reward and Affine Driver Pricing
In this section, we present the driver’s lifetime earnings rate R(w,σ), using the renewal
reward theorem on an appropriately defined renewal process. For the dynamic model, this
process is not immediate from the primitives defined; we break down the lifetime driver’s
earning rate into: (1) a function of the fraction of her time she spends in each such state
and (2) the earnings rates while the driver is open in each state or on a job that started in
that state. This decomposition allows us to analyze the driver’s (best response) strategy
to payout w in our dynamic model.
We are especially interested in affine pricing schemes, where wi(τ) = miτ + ai, with
mi ≥ 0 (in the single-state model: w(τ) =mτ + a, with m≥ 0). Such pricing functions can
be clearly communicated as time and distance rates (see, e.g., (Uber 2019c)), or otherwise
be displayed on a surge heat-map. We refer to the case with ai > 0 (ai < 0) as positive
(negative) affine pricing.
Below, we first characterize the driver’s best-response strategy with respect to any pric-
ing function w in the single-state model. We observe that multiplicative pricing — a special
case of affine pricing where w(τ) = mτ — is incentive compatible. In contrast, in Sec-
tion 3.2, we show that in the dynamic model multiplicative pricing may no be longer
incentive compatible. We further derive the structure of optimal driver policies in each
state with respect to affine or multiplicative pricing, which will enable numerical study of
the (approximate) incentive compatibility properties of additive and multiplicative surge in
Section 5. Section 3.4 discusses the key differences in the two models, setting up Section 4
where we derive incentive compatible pricing functions.
3.1. Single-state model
In the single-state model, the primitives of our model directly induce a renewal reward
process, where a given renewal cycle is defined as being from the time a driver is newly
open to the time she is open again after completing a job. Let W (σ) denote the mean
6 Coupled pricing imposes more constraints on the pricing functions chosen by the platform. For example, Bai et al.
(2018) find that the platform should adjust its payout ratio with demand – an example of decoupled pricing – to
maximize profit or overall welfare.
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earnings on trips τ ∈ σ, i.e. the expected earning in a renewal cycle; let T (σ) be the sum of
the expected wait time to an accepted trip and the expected length of a trip, and thus the
expected renewal cycle length. Then, the lifetime mean hourly earnings (earnings rate) for
a driver is given by
R(w,σ) =
W (σ)
T (σ)
=
1
F (σ)
∫
τ∈σw(τ)dF (τ)
1
F (σ)λ
+ 1
F (σ)
∫
τ∈σ τdF (τ)
where F (σ) denotes the probability of the driver receiving a job request τ ∈ σ. The first
equality follows from the Renewal Reward Theorem, and holds with probability 1 (see,
e.g., Gallager (2013)). We view the earnings rate as a constraint for the platform in its
pricing. Given some demand model, the platform receives revenue at a rate that depends
on the prices it sets for riders. This revenue rate yields a earnings payout rate target R,
at which the platform needs to pay drivers. Then, the platform task is to find an incentive
compatible pricing function w such that the actual earnings rate for drivers who accept
every trip meets the target, R(w, (0,∞)) =R. This is close to how decoupled surge pricing
is set in practice, where the revenue from the rider-surge is viewed as a target for average
driver surge earnings.
Our first result is that, in the single-state model, the driver’s optimal policy has a simple
form.
Theorem 1. In the single-state model, for each w there exists a constant cw ∈R+ such
that the policy σ∗ =
{
τ : w(τ)
τ
≥ cw
}
is optimal for the driver with respect to w.
Theorem 1 establishes that, in a single-state model with Poisson job arrivals, the length
of the job is not important, only the hourly rate while busy on the job. Note, however,
that the optimal cw in the policy is not necessarily cw = sup
w(τ)
τ
: drivers must trade off
the earnings rate while on a trip with their utilization rate; the more trips that a driver
rejects, the longer she must wait for an acceptable trip. In the appendix we prove the
result by, starting at an arbitrary policy σ, making changes to the policy that increase the
earnings rate while on a job without decreasing the utilization rate. Thus, each such change
improves the reward R(w,σ), and the sequence of changes results in a policy of the above
form, for some c′. Then, this minimum on-job earnings rate c′ can be optimized, leading
to an optimal policy of this form.
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An immediate corollary of Theorem 1 is that w(τ) = mτ , for m > 0, is IC. In other
words, if the platform pays a constant hourly rate w(τ)
τ
= m to busy drivers then in the
single-state model it is in the driver’s best interest to accept every trip. This result is
driven by the following insight: while receiving long trip requests is more beneficial to
drivers in the single-state setting as they increase one’s utilization rate (the driver is busy
for a longer time until her next open period), rejecting short trips to cherry-pick long trips
decreases utilization by the same amount.7 Further note that, given a earnings rate target
R, calculating the multiplier m and thus an IC pricing policy is trivial.
On the other hand, affine pricing may not be incentive compatible because short trips
are worth more per hour than are long trips: w(τ)
τ
= m+ a
τ
. The optimal policy may be
to accept trips in σ∗ = (0, T ) for some T . However, our next proposition establishes that
affine pricing is incentive compatible if the additive component stays small enough as a
function of the request arrival rate:
Proposition 1. In the single-state model, w(τ) = mτ + a is incentive compatible if
0≤ a≤ m
λ
.
The sufficient condition has a simple intuition: when open, the expected amount of time
the driver must wait for her next request is 1
λ
; if on-trip time is valued at m per unit-time,
then with a = m
λ
the additive component can be interpreted as paying for the driver’s
expected waiting time. Thus, while a driver may earn more per hour for a short trip than
a long trip with affine pricing, such a short trip is not worth the time the driver must wait
for her next trip request. We further note that the condition in the proposition is not a
necessary one; however, deriving necessary and sufficient conditions in closed form requires
specifying the trip distribution F .
As we’ll see in the next sub-section, the structure of optimal driver policies in reaction
to affine pricing differs sharply in the dynamic model.
3.2. Dynamic model
We start our analysis of the dynamic model by characterizing the lifetime driver earnings
rate, R(w,σ). Here, we can no longer directly use the renewal reward theorem as in the
7 As discussed in the related work, this corollary and insight is similar to a result of Kamble (2018); however, the
proof is more involved in our setting as a driver’s strategy σ is a subset of R+ denoting the job requests she accepts,
as opposed to a discrete set of prices she charges. Further, in our setting, the driver responds to the platform’s prices
instead of setting her own prices, enabling a wider range of IC pricing mechanisms.
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single-state model, with a renewal cycle containing just a single trip. The driver’s earning
on a given trip is no longer independent of her earnings on other trips: given a job that
starts in the surge state, the driver’s next job is more likely to start in the surge state.
Given whether each job started in the surge state, however, job earnings are independent.
We can use this property to prove our next lemma, which gives the mean hourly reward
overall in the dynamic model.
Lemma 1. The overall earning rate can be decomposed into the earnings rate Ri(wi, σi)
and fraction of time µi(σ) spent in state i. The following equality holds with probability 1:
R(w,σ), lim inf
t→∞
R(w,σ, t)
t
= µ1(σ)R1(w1, σ1) +µ2(σ)R2(w2, σ2).
As in the single-state model, Ri(wi, σi) =
Wi(σi)
Ti(σi)
, where
Wi(σi) =
1
Fi(σi)
∫
τ∈σi
wi(τ)dFi(τ), Ti(σi) =
1
λiFi(σi)
+
1
Fi(σi)
∫
τ∈σi
τdFi(τ)
We prove the result as follows. We define a new renewal process, in which a single reward
renewal cycle is: the time between the driver is open in state 1 to the next time the driver
is open in state 1 after being open in state 2 at least once. In other words, each renewal
cycle is composed of a number of sub-cycles in which the driver is open in state 1 and then
is open in state 1 again after a completed trip; one sub-cycle which starts with the driver
open in state 1 and ends with her open in state 2 (either after a completed trip or a state
transition while open); a number of sub-cycles in which the driver is open in state 2 and
then is open in state 2 again after a completed trip; and finally one sub-cycle starting in
state 2 and ending with the driver open in state 1.
Now, given the number of such large renewal reward cycles completed up to each time t,
the total earnings on trips starting in each state (earnings in each sub-cycle) are indepen-
dent of each other, resulting in the separation. Then, we use Wald’s identity (Wald 1973)
to separate µi(σ) and Ri(σi).
Note that Ti(σi) is not exactly the expected length of time in a single sub-cycle in a state
given σi, but rather is proportional to it; the multiplicative constant
1
λiFi(σi)+λi→j
cancels
out with the same constant in the expected earnings in a single sub-cycle in a state given
σi. This constant emerges from our surge primitives: when the driver is open in state i,
there are two competing exponential clocks (with rates λiFi(σi) and λi→j, respectively)
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that determine whether the driver will accept a trip request in state i before the world
state changes to state j. Furthermore, we can now precisely define what it means for i= 2
to be the surge state: it has a higher potential earning rate than state 1; ∃σ2 such that
R2(w2, σ2)>R1(w1, σ1),∀σ1 ⊆ R+. This assumption is not the same as w2(τ)≥ w1(τ),∀τ ,
and neither implies the other; it is a condition jointly on λi, Fi,wi, (but not λi→j), indicating
that a driver can, following some policy, earn more while in the surge state than she
can following any policy in the non-surge state. Throughout, we set i = 2 as the surge
state according to this definition. When constructing pricing functions w1,w2, we will also
require the following constraint to be met: Ri(wi, (0,∞)) =Ri, for some exogenous R2 >R1,
analogously to the single-state model constraint.
What does µi(σ) look like? We defer showing the exact form to Section 4.1 in advance of
developing incentive compatible pricing. Here, we provide some intuition: the trips that a
driver accepts in each state determines the portion of her time she spends on trips started
in each state. For example, if a driver never accepts trips in the non-surge state, she will be
open and thus available for a trip as soon as surge begins. Inversely, if a driver accepts a long
surge trip immediately before surge ends, she will be paid according to the surge payment
function w2 even though surge has ended. Surprisingly, given the complex formulation of
the reward R(w,σ) as it depends on σ = {σ1, σ2}, we can find the structure of optimal
policies as they depend on the pricing structure wi, as well as incentive compatible pricing
functions. We begin this analysis in the next subsection, deriving optimal driver responses
to multiplicative and affine pricing.
3.3. Driver’s Best-Response Strategy to Affine Prices
In the single-state model, multiplicative pricing is incentive compatible; a driver cannot
benefit in the future by rejecting certain trips if all trips have the same hourly earning
rate. In contrast, we now show that the same insight does not hold for the dynamic model,
as a driver can influence her future trips through her decision to accept or reject certain
trips.
Theorem 2. Consider pricing w = {w1,w2}. Then, there exists an optimal policy σ =
{σ1, σ2} (i.e. that maximizes R(w,σ)), defined with parameters t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6 ∈ [0,∞)∪
{∞}, such that
• Non-surge state driver optimal policy σ1:
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— If w1 is multiplicative or positive affine, σ1 rejects long trips, i.e. σ1 = (0, t1).
— If w1 is negative affine, σ1 rejects short and long trips, i.e. σ1 = (t2, t3).
• Surge state driver optimal policy σ2:
— If w2 is multiplicative or negative affine, σ2 rejects short trips, i.e. σ2 = (t4,∞).
— If w2 is positive affine, σ2 rejects medium length trips, i.e. σ2 = (0, t5)∪ (t6,∞).
Furthermore, there exist settings where ti’s take positive finite values. Hence, multiplica-
tive pricing is not incentive compatible in general.
We discuss the intuition in the next section. In the appendix, we prove the result for
each case as follows: fixing σj for j 6= i, we start with an arbitrary open set σi =∪∞k (`k, uk),
recalling that open sets can be written as a countable union of such disjoint intervals.
Then, we find ∂
∂uk
R(w,σ), the derivative of the set function R(w,σ) with respect to one
of the interval upper end-points of σi, i.e. uk. This derivative is the infinitesimal change
in the overall reward if σi is expanded by increasing uk, and it has useful properties. In
the surge state with multiplicative pricing, for example, ∂
∂u
R(w,σ) has the same sign as
a function that is increasing in u, for each fixed σ. With affine pricing, it has the same
sign as a quasi-convex (positive affine in the surge state) or quasi-concave (negative affine
in the non-surge state) function in u, for a fixed σ. Such properties enable constructing a
sequence of changes to σi that each do not decrease the reward R(w,σ), with the limit being
a policy of the appropriate form. In particular, we can show that any policy that is not of
the appropriate form above has ∂
∂uk
R(w,σ)≥ 0 for some uk, allowing local improvements
until adjacent intervals (`k, uk), (`k+1, uk+1) can be combined or expanded to infinity.
Further note that the results of rejecting long trips in non-surge (and short trips in surge)
extend to arbitrary pricing functions where w1(τ)
τ
is non-increasing (respectively, w2(τ)
τ
is
non-decreasing), as the same properties hold. The other two results do not hold with such
generality, as the behavior of the derivative may be arbitrarily complex.
3.4. Why is multiplicative surge pricing not incentive compatible?
“I thoroughly dislike short trips ESPECIALLY when I’m picking up in a waning surge zone”
Anonymous driver
What explains the difference between multiplicative pricing being incentive compatible
in the single-state model but not in the dynamic model? In the latter, a driver’s policy
affects not just her earnings while she is busy, but also the fraction of her time at which
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she is busy during the lucrative surge state. In particular, it turns out, accepting short
trips during surge may reduce the amount of time that a driver is on a surge trip! Figure 2
shows in an example how the fraction of time in the surge state µ2(σ) changes as a
function of how many short trips the driver rejects. The anonymous driver we quote above
identifies the key effect: when surge is short-lived, a driver may only have the chance
to complete one surge trip before it ends. Thus, the driver may be better off waiting to
receive a longer trip request, as with multiplicative surge she is paid a higher rate for the
full duration of the longer trip. (Of course, there is a trade-off as if she rejects too many
trip requests, she may not receive any acceptable request before surge ends). In the surge
state, then, multiplicative pricing does not compensate drivers enough to accept short
trips that may reduce their future surge earnings. In the non-surge state, analogously,
multiplicative pricing under-compensates long trips that may prevent taking advantage of
a future surge.
Affine pricing is a first, reasonable attempt at fixing these issues. In the surge state, the
additive value makes the previously under-compensated short trips comparatively more
valuable, as the earnings per unit time w2(τ)
τ
= m2 +
a2
τ
(with a2 > 0) are now higher for
short trips. Unfortunately, with such pricing the structure for the surge optimal policy
becomes σ2 = (0, t5)∪ (t6,∞) – if the values m2, a2 are not balanced correctly, the additive
value is enough to make accepting extremely short trips (0, t5) profitable; for medium-
length trips τ ∈ (t5, t6), however, the additive value is not large enough to make up for
the fact that accepting the trip prevents accepting another surged trip before surge ends.
Similarly, negative affine pricing in the non-surge state, w1(τ) =m1τ +a1, (with a1 < 0) is
now too harsh on very short trips but potentially not enticing enough for long trips.
We expand further on such effects in the next section, where we fix these issues by
constructing true incentive compatible pricing schemes for both states. Then, in Section 5
we use the structural results derived in this section to perform numerical simulations
comparing (approximate) incentive compatibility of additive and multiplicative surge.
4. Incentive Compatible Surge Pricing
In this section, we present our main result regarding the structure of incentive compatible
pricing in the dynamic model. As discussed earlier, consistent with decoupled pricing, we
distinguish between the two states by assuming that the surge state has a higher potential
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Figure 2 Fraction of time spent in surge state, µ2(σ), with driver policy σ= {σ1 = (0,∞), σ2}, where σ2 = (t,∞),
i.e. t is the minimum trip length accepted in the surge state. The primitives are as follows: λ1 = λ2 =
12, λ1→2 = 1, λ2→1 = 4; in both states, trip lengths are distributed according to a Weibull distribution
with shape 2 and mean 1
3
. These parameters reflect realistic average trip to wait time values, and that
surge tends to be short-lived compared to non-surge times. Note that the driver can increase the time
she spends in the surge state by rejecting short surge trips.
earnings rate than the non-surge state. We further require earning rate constraints as
before: the platform must set pricing function wi to satisfy Ri(wi, (0,∞)) =Ri, i.e. the state
i earnings rate for drivers who accept every trip in that state is set to Ri, for (exogenously)
given R2 >R1. We focus on the driver’s decision on accepting or rejecting a trip, observing
that this decision depends on the “opportunity cost” of performing that trip. A driver’s
expected value for accepting a trip is the payout from that trip, plus the continuation value
which depends on the world state when the trip is completed and she becomes open again.
If the driver rejects a trip, she can accept other trips during the time it would have taken
to complete that trip. If the state transitions in the meantime, some of those trips could
be lucrative surge trips. Intuitively, we find incentive compatible prices that compensate
drivers for such opportunity costs.
To this aim, in Section 4.1, we characterize, µi(σ), how much time the driver spends in
each state. In Section 4.2, we present incentive compatible prices, under mild conditions
on the ratio of earning rates between the two states. Section 4.3 contains a discussion on
the intuition of the IC pricing structure in terms of the driver’s opportunity cost, and
Section 4.4 contains a proof sketch.
4.1. Transition probabilities and expected time spent in each state
The expected fraction of time spent in each state, µi(σ), depends both on the evolution
of the world state and the trips a driver accepts in each state. In order to quantify the
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effects previewed in Section 3.4, we first need to analyze the evolution of the CTMC that
determines the surge state.
Lemma 2. Suppose the world is in state i at time t. Let qi→j(s) denote the probability
that the world will be in state j 6= i at time t+ s. Then,
qi→j(s) =
λi→j
λi→j +λj→i
[
1− e−(λi→j+λj→i)s]
Note that qi→j(s) is not just the probability that the world state transitions once during
time (t, t+ s), but the probability that it transitions an odd number of times. This formu-
lation emerges through a standard analysis of two-state CTMCs, in which this probability
can be found through the inverse of the Laplace transform of the inverse of the resolvent of
the Q-matrix for the system. Incorporating this value in closed form is the main hurdle in
extending our results to general systems with more than two states. Using this formulation,
the following lemma shows µi(σ).
Lemma 3. Let Ti(σi) be as defined in Lemma 1. The fraction of time a driver following
strategy σ= {σ1, σ2} spends either open in state i or on a trip started in state i is
µi(σ) =
λiFi(σi)Ti(σi)Qj(σj)
λjFj(σj)Tj(σj)Qi(σi) +λiFi(σi)Ti(σi)Qj(σj)
where Qi(σi) = λi→j +λi
∫
τ∈σi
qi→j(τ)dFi(τ)
We prove this lemma by finding the expected number of sub-cycles in each state i, i.e.,
within a larger renewal reward cycle as defined, the expected number of sub-cycles that
start with the driver being open in state i. This expectation is the mean of a geometric
random variable parameterized by the probability that the driver will next be open in state
j, given she is currently open in state i. Qi(σi) is proportional to this probability. (As in
the case of Ti(σi), there is a normalizing constant
1
λiFi(σi)+λi→j
); the larger it is, the fewer
sub-cycles that are spent in state i. It has two components: the first is the probability that
the state changes before the driver accepts a trip request; the second is the probability
that the world state is j when the driver completes a trip. Thus, the numerator in µi(σ) is
proportional to the length of a sub-cycle in state i, times the fraction of such cycles that
are started in state i. The larger Qj(σj) or Ti(σi) is, the more time the driver spends in
state i.
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4.2. Incentive Compatible pricing
How can the platform create incentive compatible pricing given the previously described
effects? Our main result establishes when such IC prices exist, and reveals their form.
Theorem 3. Let R1 and R2 be target earning rates during non-surged and surge states,
respectively. There exist prices w= {w1,w2} of the form
wi(τ) =miτ + ziqi→j(τ),
where m1,m2, z2 ≥ 0 (but z1 may be either positive or negative), such that the optimal driver
policy is to accept every trip in the surge state and all trips up to a certain length in the
non-surge state. Furthermore, for R1
R2
∈ [C,1], there exist fully incentive compatible prices
of this form, where
C = 1− 1
T1
Q2(λ12T1−Q1) +Q1(T2λ1→2 +Q2)
Q2(λ1→2T1−Q1) +λ1→2(T2λ1→2 +Q2) ∈ [0,1),
and Ti = λiFi(σi)Ti((0,∞)), and Qi =Qi((0,∞)).
We discuss a sketch of the proof in Section 4.4, with the complete proof in the appendix.
To convey intuition, Figure 3a shows pricing functions in each state, plotting wi(τ)
τ
against
τ . Compared to multiplicative pricing with constant wi(τ)
τ
, IC surge pricing pays more
for short trips, to compensate drivers for their opportunity cost, and less for short trips.
Inversely, IC non-surge pricing pays more for long trips than it does for short trips. Further,
as τ increases, w1(τ) approaches w2(τ), reflecting the fact that the opportunity cost for
long trips does not depend as strongly on the state in which it started (as discussed in
Section 4.3). Next, observe that IC surge pricing w2(τ) =m2τ +z2q2→1(τ) is approximately
affine: q2→1(τ) (plotted in Figure 3b) is upper bounded by λ2→1λ1→2+λ2→1 , and so is eventually
approximately constant even as τ increases. The two components of pricing, mi and zi,
thus balance the comparative benefit of long and short trips.
We note that, rather surprisingly and contrary to the focus of platform designers, it is
the non-surge state that is difficult to make incentive compatible. Our result establishes
that there always exist pricing schemes, for any target driver earning rates R1 <R2, such
that accepting every trip in the surge state is driver optimal; we cannot say the same
for the non-surge state. We give further intuition for the form of the pricing function wi
and the range [C,1] in the next subsection, showing how they emerge from the driver’s
opportunity cost.
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(b) q2→1(τ) when λ1→2 = 1, λ2→1 = 4. The shape
suggests that IC surge pricing is well-approximated
by an affine function: z2q2→1(τ) remains essentially
constant for longer trips.
Figure 3 Using the same model primitives as in Figure 2: (1) how the incentive compatible pricing compares to
multiplicative pricing, and (2) q2→1(τ)
Finally, for a given feasible R1,R2, there is a range of mi, zi that form an incentive
compatible pricing scheme. Why? If a driver rejects a trip request, she waits to receive
another request, during which time she does not earn. This wait time tilts the driver toward
accepting any trip request to maximize earnings. Thus, there is flexibility in the balance
between short and long trip earnings. The same insight drives Proposition 1; even in the
single-state model, trips do not have to have the same earnings per unit time, w(τ)
τ
, as long
as they meet some minimum threshold, w(τ)
τ
≥ cw.
4.3. Opportunity cost intuition for incentive compatible pricing
We now present some intuition to understand Theorem 3 and our incentive compatible
pricing scheme. To do so, we introduce a weaker property than incentive compatibility,
trip indifference: given a specific trip request length τ , in expectation the driver is at
least as well off accepting the request as she is rejecting it, assuming she will accept any
future request.8
8 If w is incentive compatible, then it also satisfies trip indifference. The latter criterion is a local condition in which the
driver cannot infinitesimally improve her earnings by instead following strategy σ′ = (0,∞) \ {τ} (“infinitesimally”,
as trip length τ has measure 0 by assumption); in contrast incentive compatibility is a global condition on the
space of driver policies, requiring that the policy σ that accepts all trips globally maximize the earnings rate, i.e.
R(w,σ)≥R(w,σ′), for all σ′.
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Figure 4 How C, the ratio R1/R2 at which IC pricing is feasible from Theorem 3, changes (1) with respect to
the mean trip length, and (2) with respect to λi→j . Except for those that are varied in each plot, the
primitives are fixed to those used in Figure 2.
Trip indifference allows us to illustrate the various features that must be incorporated
into any IC pricing scheme: given an accepted trip request, it is simple in our model to
formulate theoretically the driver’s counter-factual expected earnings in a certain time
window if she had instead rejected the request, i.e. her opportunity cost for accepting the
trip.9 Intuitively, the amount wi(τ) that the driver is paid for the trip must account for
this opportunity cost, i.e. in a VCG-like manner. Of course, this opportunity cost itself
depends on the pricing scheme w. We now break down parts of this opportunity cost.
On-trip opportunity cost. While the driver is on-trip, the world state continues to evolve:
surge might end or start, and such changes affect the opportunity cost. We call this com-
ponent the “network minutes” cost.
Let φki (τ) be the expected amount of time that the world is in state k during time
(t, t+ τ), given that it is in state i at time t. Then, by integrating qi→j(s) from 0 to τ :
φii(τ) =
[
λj→i
λi→j +λj→i
]
τ +
[
1
λi→j +λj→i
]
qi→j(τ)
φji (τ) =
[
λi→j
λi→j +λj→i
]
τ −
[
1
λi→j +λj→i
]
qi→j(τ) = τ −φii(τ)
What does this tell us about the opportunity cost? Let us define R˜i as the driver’s earnings
rate while the world state is i (whether the driver is open, or on a trip that started in
9 Similarly, it is easier to measure empirically: counter-factual driver earnings for a accepted trip request can be
approximated by measuring the future earnings of other nearby drivers who did not receive that trip request. Verifying
incentive compatibility, on the other hand, requires full off-policy learning and estimation.
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either state). R˜i is close to but not exactly Ri, which instead is the earnings rate counting
open time and trips that start in state i. Then, the driver’s opportunity cost during time
(t, t+ τ), starting in state i is
R˜iφ
i
i(τ) + R˜jφ
j
i (τ) =
[
λj→iR˜i +λi→jR˜j
λi→j +λj→i
]
τ +
[
R˜i− R˜j
λi→j +λj→i
]
qi→j(τ)
Though R˜i is not a simple expression in terms of Ri, several insights emerge:
One. The network minutes opportunity cost is of the form, m′iτ + z
′
iqi→j(τ), for some
m′i, z
′
i. This matches the shape of our IC pricing scheme, which has different mi, zi that
incorporate complications ignored here.
Two. As trip length τ →∞, the first component
[
λj→iR˜i+λi→jR˜j
λi→j+λj→i
]
τ dominates the oppor-
tunity cost. This component is the same whether the given trip request starts in state i= 1
or i= 2, i.e. the stationary distribution of a positive recurrent CTMC does not depend on
the starting state. This fact implies that we cannot always construct incentive compatible
prices, for any R1,R2: as τ →∞, the trip’s opportunity cost does not depend on the start-
ing state i, and so the trip’s payments must be similar, w1(τ)≈ w2(τ). When all trips in
the non-surge state are long, i.e. F1 is concentrated around large values, the earnings rate
in each state must be similar, R1 ≈R2.
C exactly encodes such constraints, as shown in Figure 4. As the mean of τ ∼ F1 goes to
0, then λ12T1−Q1→ 0 and so C→ 0, and so the range of feasible R1R2 expands. Similarly,
λ2→1 also plays a large role. When small, the surge state is long. Thus, regardless of how
long a driver’s last non-surge trip is, she will receive many trips during surge – and so long
trips during non-surge are no longer constrained to be highly paid compared to short trips.
Continuation value opportunity cost The previous discussion misses a crucial detail: it is
not sufficient to consider just the opportunity cost for the duration of the trip. A driver’s
counter-factual earnings by rejecting the trip depends on future trips that she accepts. Such
counter-factual trips both (1) pay the driver according to their starting state even after
a world state transition, i.e. the difference between Ri and R˜i above; and (2) potentially
are still in progress past time t+ τ , when the current trip ends. This second complication
is illustrated in Figure 2, where a driver can extend the time she spends on trips starting
in the surge state by rejecting short surge trips. The effect depends on the lengths of
future potential trips, i.e. Ti(σi), and state transitions during those trips, Qi(σi), and is
incorporated in both C and the pricing scheme.
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Figure 5 Using the same model primitives as in Figure 2: the payment function wi(τ) for various surge mecha-
nisms plotted two ways, when R2 = 1 and R1 =
2
3
for drivers who accept every trip.
4.4. Proof sketch of Theorem 3
The result is shown in the appendix by manipulating the derivative of the reward function
with respect to the policy σ. In particular, when the pricing function is of the given form
with the appropriate constants mi, zi, then any policy σ= {σ1, σ2} can be locally improved
by adding more trips to it, i.e. the overall reward is non-decreasing as the driver accepts
more trips: R(σ′)≥R(σ),∀σ ⊆ σ′. This result follows from ∂
∂u
R(σ)≥ 0, for all u,σ, given
the constraints, where u is an upper endpoint of the policy in a state, σi =∪k(`k, uk).
The key step is finding sufficient constraints for this derivative to be positive with a
pricing function of the given form, given any σi, as opposed to just σi = (0,∞). This
difficulty emerges because incentive compatibility is a global condition on the set function
R(w,σ). In particular, we need to express these constraints simply – e.g. as a function of
just Ti((0,∞)),Qi((0,∞)), instead of the values Ti(σi),Qi(σi),∀σi ⊆R+. The C presented
in the theorem statement results from such a set of constraints on mi, zi.
5. Approximate Incentive Compatibility with Additive Surge
We now analyze surge policies that reflect practice at ride-hailing platforms today, as
they are simple to communicate through a heat-map. Non-surge pricing is typically purely
multiplicative, i.e w1(τ) =m1τ , where m1 is the base time (and distance) rate for a ride.
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We consider two types of affine surge pricing w2, which differ in their relationship to w1
through a single parameter:
Multiplicative surge: w2(τ) =m2τ m2 ≥m1
Additive surge: w2(τ) =m1τ + a2 a2 ≥ 0
In multiplicative surge, a higher multiplier is used than the base fare m1, and
m2
m1
is reported
on the heatmap as in Figure 1a; in additive surge, the same base fare multiplier m1 on the
trip length is used in both surge and non-surge times, with an additive factor a2 during
surge that is reported on the heatmap in Figure 1b. These surge functions are simple to
calculate, given fixed primitives and target earnings rate R2 in the surge state: m2 or a2
are determined given these values.
Figure 5 shows these types of pricing, compared to the incentive compatible pricing
function. Multiplicative surge has constant w2(τ)
τ
and so under-pays short trips and over-
pays long-trips compared to IC pricing. Additive surge asymptotically (for large τ) pays
the same as multiplicative non-surge pricing, i.e. limτ→∞
w2(τ)
τ
= limτ→∞
w1(τ)
τ
=m1. As a
result, it over-pays short trips and under-pays long trips compared to IC surge pricing.
Uber has recently started a transition from multiplicative to additive surge. In this
section, we argue that the additive component is more important than the multiplicative
component for incentive compatibility, motivating Uber’s transition.
Computing optimal driver policies Recall that Theorem 2 establishes that multiplicative
pricing (and, more generally, affine pricing) may not be incentive compatible. However, we
still wish to compare the various types of surge pricing. We thus compare how approx-
imately compatible these pricing functions are, in the sense of what fraction of trips is
accepted by an optimal driver policy with respect to the pricing function.
However, to do this comparison, one needs to calculate optimal driver policies with
respect to a pricing function. Recall that the optimal driver policy in each state σi is some
subset of R+. Finding such optimal subsets for general pricing functions w is computa-
tionally intractable. Thus, Theorem 2 is particularly important for computational reasons.
It establishes that, for any affine pricing structure in the surge state, there exists a driver
optimal policy of the form (0, t1) ∪ (t2,∞), for some t1, t2. Thus, we only need to find
the values for these parameters that maximize the driver reward among sets of this form,
and the resulting policy is optimal. Deriving closed forms is still intractable, but we can
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Figure 6 How the fraction of trips accepted in the surge state in the optimal policy varies with primitives. The
shaded regions are areas where the respective surge type is fully incentive compatible in the surge state
(σ2 = (0,∞) is optimal). The plots also include contour lines, with values embedded. When not varied,
the primitives are λ1 = λ2 = 10, λ1→2 = 1, λ2→1 = 4,R2 = 1,R1 = 0.3, and the mean trip length is 0.3.
We assume every trip is accepted in the non-surge state.
computationally find them through grid search and numeric integration. Note that the
proposition does not establish uniqueness of the driver optimal policy; we thus choose the
policy that maximizes the fraction of trips accepted in our computations.
Approximate incentive compatibility We now study how (approximately) incentive compat-
ible the surge mechanisms are, i.e. the fraction of trips accepted in the surge state by the
optimal policy. Figure 6 shows how this fraction changes with the primitives. The shaded
regions correspond to areas where the surge pricing function is fully incentive compatible
in the surge state (σ2 = (0,∞) is optimal), and the lines are contour lines for approxi-
mate incentive compatibility, indicating the fraction of trips accepted. For example, when
R2 = 3, λ2 = 30, then about 90% are accepted with additive surge, and 70% are accepted
with multiplicative surge.
Overall, we note that additive surge is far more approximately incentive compatible in
the most common parameter regimes for ride-hailing platforms such as Uber: (1) surge is
between 1.1 and 3 times more valuable than non-surge; (2) surge is short-lived compared
to non-surge periods (λ2→1 λ1→2); (3) and in a typical surge the driver will be able to
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receive several trip requests ( λ2
λ2→1
> 1, but small) but may only be able to complete one
or two such trips ( 1
λ2→1
≈ mean trip length). In each of these regimes, additive surge is
either fully incentive compatible or more approximately IC than is multiplicative surge.
For example, with R2 = 2 (i.e. a surge multiplier of 2), every trip is accepted with additive
surge for any λ2 in our range, whereas up to 40% of trips are rejected with multiplicative
surge. These simulations thus support Uber’s recent shift from multiplicative to additive
surge. We can also draw qualitative insights in terms of sensitivity to the primitives, similar
in spirit to effects in the form of C in Theorem 3.
Figure 6a shows how the approximate IC properties of additive and multiplicative surge
change with λ2 and R2. As the arrival rate of jobs in the surge state, λ2, increases, both
types of surge become less incentive compatible: “cherry-picking” becomes easier, as the
driver is likely to receive many more trip requests before surge ends. Similarly, as surge
becomes increasingly more valuable compared to non-surge (R2 increases), the incentive to
reject non-valuable trips in the surge state increases (short trips with multiplicative surge,
long trips with additive surge).
For additive surge, an interesting non-monotonicity with R2: when R2R1, the effect
above dominates, and long trips are rejected. When the surge state is moderately more
valuable than non-surge, additive surge effectively balances the payments for different
trip lengths, and so is incentive compatible. When the two states become almost equally
valuable, however, again the optimal driver policy with additive surge rejects long trips: the
system approximates our single-state model, and so additive surge may not be incentive
compatible, cf. Theorem 1.
Figure 6b shows the effects of the relative lengths of surge and non-surge. Note that, here,
the two types of surge are incentive compatible in exactly opposing regimes. When λ2→1
λ1→2
is
large, surge is comparatively rare and short, and so short trips are naturally undervalued
— accepting them decreases the time spent in the surge state — and additive surge is more
incentive compatible. With long-lasting surge (small λ2→1
λ1→2
), on the other hand, the world
almost seems unchanging in the surge state, and so multiplicative surge nears incentive
compatibility. In modern ride-hailing platforms, the scenario with short, in-frequent surge
is more common.
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6. Conclusion
In this work, we studied the problem of designing incentive compatible mechanisms for
ride-hailing marketplaces. We presented a dynamic model to capture essential features of
these environments. Even-though our model is simple and stylized, it highlights how driver
incentives and subsequently dynamic pricing strategies would change in the presence of
stochasticity. We hope our work inspires other researchers in this area to incorporate such
uncertainty in their models, as it is one of the biggest challenges faced in practice.
An important direction for extending our work is studying matching and pricing polices
jointly, i.e. how to best match open drivers to riders in the presence of such effects, cf.
(O¨zkan and Ward 2016, Banerjee et al. 2017, Feng et al. 2017, Zhang et al. 2017, Banerjee
et al. 2018, Hu and Zhou 2018, Korolko et al. 2018, Ashlagi et al. 2018, Kanoria and Qian
2019). In this work, we look at incentive compatible pricing. The platform, in addition to
pricing, can use matching policy to align incentives.
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Appendix A: Proofs of main text theorems and lemmas
In this Appendix, we provide proofs of the theorems and lemmas in the main text. The proofs rely on
claims proved in Appendix Section B.
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A.1. Notation and assumptions
Notation.
• In general for the dynamic model, we use σ in the function argument when the function depends on
policies in both states, and σi when it only depends on the policy in state i.
• In the dynamic model, let ∆(σi, σj) =Ri(wi, σi)−Rj(wj , σj).
• All policy equalities are up to measure 0.
• We use ∝ to denote has the same sign as, rather than proportional to
Assumptions (repeat from main text).
• Distribution of jobs F,Fi is a continuous probability measure, i.e. f, fi bounded.
• Payment functions w,wi are continuous.
• We assume that there exists a policy in state 2 that dominates state 1: ∃σ2 such that
∆(σ2, σ1)> 0,∀σ1 ⊆ (0,∞).
• σ,σi constrained to be measurable with respect to F,Fi, and σi are open.
A.2. Single-state model theorem and propositions proofs
A.2.1. Proof of Theorem 1 We now prove Theorem 1, regarding the form of the optimal policy in
the single-state model – where the length of a trip does not matter, only the earnings rate. The optimal
policy trades off the earnings rate while on a trip with the driver’s utilization rate. At a high level, the
proof proceeds as follows: starting from any policy that is not of the appropriate form, we replace trips in
the policy with those with a higher earnings rate, while keeping the utilization rate exactly the same. Such
replacements result in a policy that is almost of the correct form, except there may be an earnings rate c
such that only a subset of {τ : w(τ)
τ
= c} is in the policy. The remainder of the proof is showing that such a
policy can be improved to form a policy of the appropriate form.
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Theorem 1. In the single-state model, for each w there exists a constant cw ∈R+ such that the policy
σ∗ =
{
τ : w(τ)
τ
≥ cw
}
is optimal for the driver with respect to w.
Proof. Let γ(τ), w(τ)
τ
. Assume that F ({τ :w(τ)> 0})> 0. Otherwise any policy is optimal and so the
result is trivial.
Start at σ( (0,∞). We first show that there exists c∈R+ such that σc = {τ : γ(τ)≥ c} or
σc = {τ : γ(τ)> c} such that R(w,σc)≥R(w,σ). Assume that 0<F ({τ :w(τ)> 0}∩σ)< 1. (If
F ({τ :w(τ)> 0}∩σ) is either 0 or 1, we are done, as R((0,∞))≥R(w,σ) and is of the desired form.)
1. First we construct σ˜c = {τ : γ(τ)> c}∪C, where C ⊆ {τ : γ(τ) = c} and R(w, σ˜c)≥R(w,σ).
For the given σ, c, let
Ac = {τ : τ /∈ σ,γ(τ)≥ c}
Bc = {τ : τ ∈ σ,γ(τ)< c}
L(X) =
∫
x∈X
τdF (τ) X ⊆ (0,∞)
Ac is a set of trips that pay more than c per unit time but are not in σ, and Bc is the set of the trips
that pay less than c per unit time but are not in σ. L(X) is the mean extra utilization that trips in X
contribute in a renewal cycle. The idea is that if we find sets A,B such that L(A) =L(B)> 0 and
γ(a)>γ(b),∀a∈A,b∈B, then σ′ = σ ∪A \B =⇒ R(w,σ′)>R(w,σ): the denominator of the reward
stays the same, and the numerator increases. A few facts that follow from assumptions:
• L(A0)> 0
• ∃c :L(Bc)> 0
• L(Bc) is non-decreasing as c increases, and L(B0) = 0
• L(Ac) is non-increasing as c increases, and limc→∞L(Ac) = 0
• L(Ac), L(Bc) both are continuous from the left in c.
• The above imply that ∃c′ such that L(Ac)<L(Bc),∀c > c′.
• Thus, there exists c0 = max{c′ :L(Ac′)≥L(Bc′)}
If L(Ac0) =L(Bc0), then we are done with this part: let σ˜c0 = σ ∪Ac0 \Bc0 = {τ : γ(τ)≥ c}.
Otherwise if L(Ac0)>L(Bc0) (which can happen if there is a point mass at γ(τ) = c):
• By max, for all c > c0: L(Ac)<L(Bc). Then
L(Bc0)<L(Ac0)<L(Bc0) +L({τ : τ ∈ σ,γ(τ) = c0})
• let C ⊆ {τ : τ ∈ σ,γ(τ) = c0} such that L(C) +L(Bc0) =L(Ac0). Such C exists by F continuous.
• Let σ˜c0 = σ ∪Ac0 \ (C ∪Bc0)
We now have σ˜c0 = {τ : γ(τ)≥ c0} \C, where C ⊆ {τ : τ ∈ σ,γ(τ) = c0}, and R(w, σ˜c0)>R(w,σ),
unless σ already was of the form σ˜c0 for some c0.
2. Next, we construct σc0 = {τ : γ(τ)≥ c0} or σc0 = {τ : γ(τ)> c0} such that R(w,σc0)≥R(w,σ).
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• Suppose c0 ≥R(w, σ˜c0). Then
R(w,{τ : γ(τ)≥ c0}) =
λ
∫
τ∈σ˜c0
w(τ)dF (τ) +λ
∫
τ∈C w(τ)dF (τ)
1 +λ
∫
τ∈σ˜c0
τdF (τ) +λ
∫
τ∈C τdF (τ)
≥R(w, σ˜c0) (1)
Where the inequality follows from R(w, σ˜c0) =
λ
∫
τ∈σ˜c0
w(τ)dF (τ)
1+λ
∫
τ∈σ˜c0
τdF (τ)
,
λ
∫
τ∈C w(τ)dF (τ)
λ
∫
τ∈C τdF (τ)
=
λ
∫
τ∈C
w(τ)
τ
τdF (τ)
λ
∫
τ∈C τdF (τ)
= c0, and
w
y
≤ x
z
=⇒ w+x
y+z
≥ w
y
.
Then let σc0 = {τ : γ(τ)≥ c0}
• Similarly, suppose c0 <R(w, σ˜c0). Then
R(w,{τ : γ(τ)> c0}) =
λ
∫
τ∈σ˜c0
w(τ)dF (τ)−λ∫
τ∈{τ :τ∈σ,γ(τ)=c0}\C w(τ)dF (τ)
1 +λ
∫
τ∈σ˜c0
τdF (τ)−λ∫
τ∈{τ :τ∈σ,γ(τ)=c0}\C τdF (τ)
>R(w, σ˜c0) (2)
Where the inequality follows from w
y
> x
z
=⇒ w−x
y−z >
w
y
.
Then let σc0 = {τ : γ(τ)> c0} (choosing arbitrarily if c0 =R(w, σ˜c0))
Thus, we have shown that for all σ, there exists σc0 = {τ : γ(τ)> c0} or σc0 = {τ : γ(τ)≥ c0} such that
R(w,σc0)≥R(w,σ).
Let σ>c = {τ : γ(τ)> c}, and σ≥c = {τ : γ(τ)≥ c}. We finish the proof by showing that ∃c∗ such that
∀c,R(w,σ≥c∗)≥max(R(w,σ≥c ),R(w,σ>c )).
By assumption of w(τ)/τ , the reward is bounded: 0≤R(w,σ>c ), 0≤R(w,σ≥c ); further, there exists C
such that ∀c >C: R(w,σ>c )<R((0,∞)),R(w,σ≥c )<R((0,∞)) (which follows from F a continuous
distribution, and so as c→∞, F ({τ : γ(τ)≥ c})→ 0.
Further, R(w,σ>c ) is continuous from the right in c, and R(w,σ
≥
c ) is continuous from the left in c, and
the two functions have the same points of discontinuities: c such that F ({τ : γ(τ) = c})> 0 (and these are
their only points of disagreement). Thus, the function max(R(w,σ≥c ),R(w,σ
>
c )) of c attains its maximum
at some c∗ ∈ [0,C].
In other words, there exists c∗ such that ∀c,max(R(w,σ≥c∗),R(w,σ>c∗))≥max(R(w,σ≥c ),R(w,σ>c )).
We finish by proving that R(w,σ≥c∗)≥R(w,σ>c∗).
• Suppose c∗ ≥R(w,σ>c∗). Then, by the same argument as line (1), R(w,σ>c∗)≤R(w,σ≥c∗).
• Suppose c∗ <R(w,σ>c∗).
— If ∃B : c∗ <B such that the mass F ({τ : γ(τ)∈ (c∗,B]}) = 0, then note that σ>c∗ is equal to σ≥B up
to a set of measure 0, and so R(w,σ>c∗) =R(w,σ
≥
B).
— Otherwise, let B : c∗ <B <R(w,σ>c∗), and note that F ({τ : γ(τ)∈ (c∗,B]})> 0. Then, by the
same argument as in line (2), R(w,σ>c∗)<R(w,σ
>
B)≤max(R(w,σ≥c∗),R(w,σ>c∗)) =R(w,σ≥c∗).
Thus, R(w,σ≥c )≥R(w,σ>c∗), for some c.
Thus, for some c∗, the policy σ≥c∗ = {τ : γ(τ)≥ c∗} is optimal. 
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A.2.2. Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1. In the single-state model, w(τ) =mτ + a is incentive compatible if 0≤ a≤ m
λ
.
Proof. Let T =
∫
τ∈(0,∞) τdF (τ). Let σ
′ = (0,∞) \σ, for some σ.
R((0,∞)) =
λ
∫
τ∈(0,∞)w(τ)dF (τ)
1 +λT
R(σ′) =
λ
∫
τ∈(0,∞)w(τ)dF (τ)−λ
∫
τ∈σw(τ)dF (τ)
1 +λT −λ∫
τ∈σ τdF (τ)
=⇒ R(σ′)≤R((0,∞)) ⇐⇒
λ
∫
τ∈(0,∞)w(τ)dF (τ)
1 +λT
<
∫
τ∈σw(τ)dF (τ)∫
τ∈σ τdF (τ)
Where the last line follows from w
y
≤ x
z
⇐⇒ w
y
≥ w−x
y−z .
Thus, a necessary and sufficient condition for incentive compatibility is that
λ
∫
τ∈(0,∞)w(τ)dF (τ)
1 +λT
≤
∫
τ∈σw(τ)dF (τ)∫
τ∈σ τdF (τ)
∀σ
Thus w(τ) =mτ is immediately incentive compatible, for all F continuous.
Further, suppose w(τ) =mτ + a. Then, for a≤ m
λ
:
λ
∫
τ∈(0,∞)w(τ)dF (τ)
1 +λT
=
λ(mT + a)
1 +λT
≤ m(1 +λT )
1 +λT
=m<
mT2 +F (σ)a
T2
,∀T2 =
∫
τ∈σw(τ)dF (τ)∫
τ∈σ τdF (τ)

A.3. Dynamic model theorem proofs
A.3.1. Proof of Theorem 2 We now prove a theorem regarding the structure of optimal policies in
reaction to various pricing functions. This theorem, alongside the non-incentive-compatibility examples
presented in our numeric simulations, directly implies Theorem 2. The proof of Theorem 3 uses this
theorem as well.
The general structure of the theorem is as follows: In Section B.1, we prove properties of the derivative of
the reward function for multiplicative and affine pricing; and in Appendix Section B.2, we prove such
properties for the Incentive Compatible pricing form. Further, in Section B.3, we show how such properties
imply existence of optimal policies in each state of the appropriate form.
In this theorem:
• Start with some arbitrary policy σ= {σ1, σ2}.
• With assumption on the surge state providing higher potential earnings, replace σ2 with a policy that
provides higher earnings in state 2 than σ1 does in state 1, without decreasing total reward.
• With theorems in B.3, replace σ1 with policy of the appropriate form, without decreasing total reward.
• With theorems in B.3, replace σ2 with policy of the appropriate form, without decreasing total reward.
Theorem 4. Consider pricing function w= {w1,w2}, where i= 2 is the surge state as defined. Then,
there exists an optimal policy σ= {σ1, σ2} that maximizes R(w,σ), with the following properties.
• Non-surge state driver optimal policy σ1:
Author: Driver Surge Pricing
34 Article submitted to ; manuscript no.
— If w1(τ) =m1τ + a1, for a1 ≥ 0, then σ1 = (0, t1), for some t1 ∈ [0,∞)∪{∞}.
— If w1(τ) =m1τ − a1, for a1 > 0, then σ1 = (t2, t3), for some t2, t3 ∈ [0,∞)∪{∞}.
— If w1 such that
∂
∂u
R(w,σ′ = {σ′1, σ′2})≥ 0 for all σ′, where u is an upper endpoint of an interval
that makes up σ′1, then σ1 = (0,∞).
• Surge state driver optimal policy σ2:
— If w2(τ) =m2τ − a2, for a2 ≥ 0, then σ1 = (t4,∞), for some t4 ∈ [0,∞).
— If w2(τ) =m2τ + a2, for a2 > 0, then σ1 = (0, t5)∪ (t6,∞), for some t5, t6 ∈ [0,∞)∪{∞}.
— If w2 such that
∂
∂u
R(w,σ′ = {σ′1, σ′2})≥ 0 for all σ′, where u is an upper endpoint of an interval
that makes up σ′2, then σ2 = (0,∞).
Proof. Let ∆(σi, σ−i) =Ri(σi)−Rj(σ−i), where σ−i , σ3−i. Let r(u, i,w,σ) be a function that has the
same sign as ∂
∂u
R(w,σ), where u is an upper endpoint of an interval that is part of σi. In B.1, we show
• (Remark 1). ∆(σi, σ−i)> 0 and wi(τ)τ non-decreasing implies r(u, i,w,σ) strictly increasing in u∈ σi.
• (Remark 1). ∆(σi, σ−i)< 0 and wi(τ)τ non-increasing implies r(u, i,w,σ) strictly decreasing in u∈ σi.
• (Lemma 5). w(τ) =mτ + a for m,a> 0 and ∆(σi, σ−i)> 0 implies r(u, i,w,σ) is strictly quasi-convex
in u∈ σi
• (Lemma 6). w(τ) =mτ − a for m,a> 0 and ∆(σi, σ−i)< 0 implies r(u, i,w,σ) is strictly quasi-concave
in u∈ σi
We need to show that there exists a σ of the appropriate form such that R(w,σ)≥R(w,σ′), for all σ′.
Start with arbitrary σ′ = {σ′1, σ′2} where σ′1, σ′2 ⊆R+ are open, measurable sets, but not of the correct
form in the theorem statement. Invoking the theorems in Section B.3 as appropriate, we construct a
sequence of changes to σ′ such that the overall reward does not decrease with each change, and the
sequence ends with a policy consistent with the theorem statement.
Step A First, we replace σ′2 with a policy σ
A
2 such that R2(σ
A
2 )>R1(σ1),∀σ1. This allows us to cite the
appropriate theorems regarding the properties of the derivative of R, that only hold when the surge
state provides higher earnings than the non-surge state.
Let σA2 be such that ∆(σ
A
2 , σ
′′
1 )> 0, for all σ
′′
1 open and measurable, and σ
A
2 ≥ σ′2. Such σA2 exists by
our assumptions on Fi,wi. Then, let σ
A , {σA1 = σ′1, σA2 }. R(w,σA)≥R(w,σ′): time spent earning
reward at the rate of R2(w2, σ
′
2) is replaced by time spent earning at rate R1(w1, σ
′
1) or earning at rate
R2(w2, σ
A
2 ); time spent earning at R1(w1, σ
′
1) may be replaced by time earning at rate R2(w2, σ
A
2 ).
Step B Now, we replace σ1 with a policy that is of the appropriate form, citing one of the theorems we
prove later on in the Appendix.
For i= 1: Let R˜(σ1),R(w,{σ1, σA2 }).
By Theorem 5 (for derivative always positive), Theorem 7 (for w1(τ)/τ non-increasing), and Theorem
9 (for w1(τ) =mτ − a for m,a> 0) :
there exists σB1 such that R(w,{σB1 , σA2 })≥R(w,{σA1 , σA2 }), and σB1 is of the required form according
to the table. Let σB , {σB1 , σB2 = σA2 }.
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Note that all the assumptions of the associated theorems are met for the appropriate case: σB2 such
that ∆(σB2 , σ
′
1)> 0, ∀σ′1, and so the scaled derivatives remain decreasing / strictly quasi-concave as
necessary.
Step C For i= 2: Now, we replace σ2 with a policy that is of the appropriate form, citing one of the
theorems we prove later on in the Appendix.
Let R˜(σ2),R(w,{σB1 , σ2}).
By Theorem 5 (for derivative always positive), Theorem 6 (for w2(τ)/τ non-decreasing), and
Theorem 8 (for w2(τ) =mτ + a for m,a> 0): there exists σ
C
2 such that
R(w,{σB1 , σC2 })≥R(w,{σB1 , σB2 }), and σC2 is of the required form according to the table. Let
σC , {σC1 = σB1 , σC2 }.
Note that, in this step, we need to confirm the assumption regarding r(u,2,w,σ) remaining strictly
increasing / strictly quasi-convex in u for a fixed σ, for all σ such that R˜(σ)≥ R˜(σB2 ) or
F (σB2 \σ ∪σ \σB2 )< δ, for some δ > 0. The chief concern is that because σ2 is changing within the
appropriate theorem, ∆(σ2, σ
B
1 ) may not remain greater than 0, and so this condition might not be
met. However this is not the case: ∆(σ2, σ
B
1 ) remains positive – by continuity, σ2 close to σ
B
2 (by
measure of set difference) implies ∆(σ2, σ
B
1 ) positive. Furthermore
R˜(σ′′2 )≥ R˜(σB2 ) ⇐⇒ R(w,{σB1 , σ′′2})≥R(w,{σB1 , σB2 }) definition of R˜
⇐⇒ pi1R1(w1, σB1 ) +pi2R2(w2, σ′′2 )≥ piaR1(w1, σB1 ) +pibR2(w2, σB2 ) (pikpolicy dependent)
∆(σ2, σ
B
1 )≤ 0 =⇒ pi1R1(w1, σB1 ) +pi2R2(w2, σ′′2 )≤R1(w1, σB1 )
∆(σB2 , σ
B
1 )> 0, pib > 0 =⇒ pi1R1(w1, σB1 ) +pi2R2(w2, σ′′2 )>R1(w1, σB1 )
By Step A, ∆(σB2 , σ
B
1 )> 0, pib > 0, and so ∆(σ2, σ
B
1 )≤ 0 would be a contradiction for
R(w,σ)≥ R˜(σB2 ).
Thus, we have constructed σ∗ = {σ∗1 = σC1 , σ∗2 = σC2 } such that σ∗1, σ∗2 correspond to theorem statement for
the appropriate cases, respectively, and R(w,σ∗)≥R(w,σ), for all σ= {σ1, σ2} where σ1, σ2 ⊆R+ are open,
measurable sets.

Theorem 2 immediately follows.
A.3.2. Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3. Let R1 and R2 be target earning rates during non-surged and surge states, respectively.
There exist prices w= {w1,w2} of the form
wi(τ) =miτ + ziqi→j(τ),
where m1,m2, z2 ≥ 0 (but z1 may be either positive or negative), such that the optimal driver policy is to
accept every trip in the surge state and all trips up to a certain length in the non-surge state. Furthermore,
for R1
R2
∈ [C,1], there exist fully incentive compatible prices of this form, where
C = 1− 1
T1
Q2(λ12T1−Q1) +Q1(T2λ1→2 +Q2)
Q2(λ1→2T1−Q1) +λ1→2(T2λ1→2 +Q2) ∈ [0,1),
and Ti = λiFi(σi)Ti((0,∞)), and Qi =Qi((0,∞)).
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Proof. Note that in the theorem statement we defined Qi, Ti as what we call Q¯i, T¯i in the helper
lemmas in Appendix Section B.2, i.e. they refer to their respective values when every trip is accepted.
Let w2(τ) =m2τ + z2q2→1(τ), and w1(τ) =m1τ + z1q1→2(τ).
From Lemmas 7 and 8 in Appendix Section B.2, the following constraints are sufficient for these prices to
have always positive derivatives, with respect to upper endpoints u of the intervals that compose either σ1
or σ2:
T1(λ2→1T2−Q2)− (Q1 +T1λ2→1)
(Q1(λ2→1T2−Q2) +λ2→1(Q1 +T1λ2→1)) ≤
z2
m2−R1 ≤
Q2T1 +Q1
Q1(Q2−λ2→1)
m1 =R2
− (T2λ1→2 +Q2)
Q2(λ1→2T1−Q1) +λ1→2(T2λ1→2 +Q2) ≤
z1
R2
≤ 1
(Q1−λ1→2)
Now, applying Theorem 4, the policy that accepts everything, σ= {(0,∞), (0,∞)}, is optimal, given
these constraints are satisfied, as the derivative is always positive.
Resulting constraints on R1,R2. These constraints limit R1,R2 with respect to each other. From
Remark 2,
W2 =m2(T2− 1) + z2(Q2−λ2→1)
W1 =m1(T1− 1) + z1(Q1−λ1→2)
Given R2, what’s the range R1 can be to still have IC in state 1?
W1 ≤R2
[
T1− 1 +
[
1
(Q1−λ1→2) (Q1−λ1→2)
]]
=⇒ R1
R2
≤ 1
W1 ≥R2
[
T1− 1−
[
(T2λ1→2 +Q2)
Q2(λ1→2T1−Q1) +λ1→2(T2λ1→2 +Q2)
]
(Q1−λ1→2)
]
=⇒ R1
R2
=
W1
T1
1
R2
≥ 1
T1
[
T1− 1−
[
(T2λ1→2 +Q2)
Q2(λ1→2T1−Q1) +λ1→2(T2λ1→2 +Q2)
]
(Q1−λ1→2)
]
= 1− 1
T1
[
1 +
(T2λ1→2 +Q2)(Q1−λ1→2)
Q2(λ1→2T1−Q1) +λ1→2(T2λ1→2 +Q2)
]
= 1− 1
T1
Q2(λ1→2T1−Q1) +λ1→2(T2λ1→2 +Q2) + (T2λ1→2 +Q2)(Q1−λ1→2)
Q2(λ1→2T1−Q1) +λ1→2(T2λ1→2 +Q2)
= 1− 1
T1
Q2(λ1→2T1−Q1) +Q1(T2λ1→2 +Q2)
Q2(λ1→2T1−Q1) +λ1→2(T2λ1→2 +Q2) =C
What about IC in state 2? If only care about that state, can support any ratio of payments:
Let z2 =
Q2T1 +Q1
Q1(Q2−λ2→1) (m2−R1), c(m2−R1)
R2 =
1
T2
[m2(T2− 1) + z2(Q2−λ2→1)]
=⇒ R2
R1
=
1
R1T2
[m2(T2− 1) + (m2−R1)c(Q2−λ2→1)]
→ 1− 1
T2
≤ 1 as m2→R1
→∞ as m2→∞
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Thus, we can make the surge state IC for any ratio of payments R2
R1
≥ 1, i.e. R1
R2
≤ 1.
Now, suppose we want to achieve R1,R2 such that
R1
R2
∈ [0,C]. From the previous line, we can still set w2
such that every trip in state 2 is accepted (the derivative with respect to the surge policy is positive
everywhere). Then, setting z1 = 0, and m1 to meet R1, all trips up to a certain length will be accepted in
the non-surge state: By Remark 1, ∂
∂u
R(w,σ) is positive up to a certain value and then negative after that,
where u is an upper endpoint of σ1.Thus, by Theorem 4, the optimal policy is of the form
σ= {(0, t1), (0,∞)}. 
A.4. Main text lemmas proofs
A.4.1. Single-state model Recall that R(w,σ, t) is the total earnings from jobs accepted up from
time 0 to time t, i.e. R(w,σ, t) =E
[∑N(t)
k=1 w(τi)
]
, where τi is the length of the ith job the driver accepts, ei
is the wait time to that job, and N(t) = |{i : 0≤ τi + ei ≤ t}| is the number of accepted jobs up to time t.
As mentioned using the renewal reward theorem in the main text,
R(w,σ), lim inf
t→∞
R(w,σ, t)
t
=
Expected cycle payment given σ
Expected cycle length given σ
=
1
F (σ)
∫
τ∈σw(τ)dF (τ)
1
F (σ)λ
+ 1
F (σ)
∫
τ∈σ τdF (τ)
The 1
λF (σ)
term is the expected value of a exponential random variable with rate λF (σ), which is the rate
at which a driver receives ride requests that she accepts.
A.4.2. Dynamic model
Lemma 1. The overall earning rate can be decomposed into the earnings rate Ri(wi, σi) and fraction of
time µi(σ) spent in state i. The following equality holds with probability 1:
R(w,σ), lim inf
t→∞
R(w,σ, t)
t
= µ1(σ)R1(w1, σ1) +µ2(σ)R2(w2, σ2).
As in the single-state model, Ri(wi, σi) =
Wi(σi)
Ti(σi)
, where
Wi(σi) =
1
Fi(σi)
∫
τ∈σi
wi(τ)dFi(τ), Ti(σi) =
1
λiFi(σi)
+
1
Fi(σi)
∫
τ∈σi
τdFi(τ)
Proof. Consider the renewal process (with cycles and sub-cycles) defined in the main text.
Let M(t) be the total number of cycles that have been completed up to time t. Let Nj(M) be the
number of sub-cycles in state j in the Mth cycle – i.e., in the Mth cycle of the single renewal process
described above, the number of times that the driver is open in state j (after transitioning from the other
state, or finishing a trip that started in the same state j). Let Sj(k,M) be the length of the kth such
sub-cycle in the Mth cycle, with expected length Sj(σj). Let pji(σj) be the probability that the current
sub-cycle is the last in state j for the current cycle – as the next cycle starts in the other state.
Finally, let Rj(wj , σj ,M) be the total amount earned in state j after M such cycles. Then:
Rj(wj , σj ,M(t)) =
M(t)∑
M=1
Nj(M)∑
k=1
Wj(k,M)
lim
t→∞
Rj(wj , σj ,M(t))
M(t)
= lim
t→∞
1
M(t)
[
M(t)∑
M=1
Wj(k,M)
pji
]
=
1
pji(σj)
Wj(σj) almost surely
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by the mean of a geometric random variable and the basic law of large numbers for renewal processes.
Similarly, we know that M(t)
t
converges to its mean almost surely as t→∞, where the mean is based on the
lengths of in each state in each cycle. Let S˜(σ) be the expected length of one of these cycles. Then:
lim
t→∞
M(t)
t
=
1
S˜(σ)
S˜(σ) =E
[
N1(1)∑
k=1
S1(k,1)
]
+E
[
N2(1)∑
k=1
S2(k,1)
]
=E[N1(1)]E[S1(k,1)] +E[N2(1)]E[S2(k,1)] Wald’s identity
=
1
p12(σ1)
S1(σ1) +
1
p21(σ2)
S2(σ2)
=⇒ lim
t→∞
M(t)
t
=
p21(σ2)p12(σ1)
p21(σ2)S1(σ1) + p12(σ1)S2(σ2)
Then, by standard algebra on multiplication with almost sure convergence
lim
t→∞
Rj(wj , σj ,M(t))
t
= lim
t→∞
Rj(wj , σj ,M(t))
M(t)
M(t)
t
=
1
pji(σj)
Wj(wj , σj)
[
p21(σ2)p12(σ1)
p21(σ2)S1(σ1) + p12(σ1)S2(σ2)
]
=
[
pij(σi)Sj(σj)
p21(σ2)S1(σ1) + p12(σ1)S2(σ2)
]
Rj(wj , σj)
Let µj(σ), pij(σi)Sj(σj)p21(σ2)S1(σ1)+p12(σ1)S2(σ2) . Putting everything together:
lim inf
t→∞
R(w,σ, t)
t
= lim inf
t→∞
R1(w1, σ1,M(t))
t
+ lim inf
t→∞
R2(w2, σ2,M(t))
t
= µ1(σ)R1(w1, σ1) +µ2(σ)R2(w2, σ2)

Lemma 2. Suppose the world is in state i at time t. Let qi→j(s) denote the probability that the world will
be in state j 6= i at time t+ s. Then,
qi→j(s) =
λi→j
λi→j +λj→i
[
1− e−(λi→j+λj→i)s]
Proof. Given the state dynamics in the model, qi→j(s) is determined by the evolution of a CTMC in
time s, given that the current state is i. We can use standard CTMC results here. Let Q denote the
Q-matrix for the world state CTMC. From the model definition,
Q=
[−λ1→2 λ1→2
λ2→1 −λ2→1
]
Recall that the state transition matrix after time t is then given by the matrix exponential eQt, which is
equal to the inverse of the Laplace transform of the inverse of the resolvent of Q:
qi→j(τ) = (e
Qτ )ij
=L−1((wI −Q)−1ij )(τ) w is a Laplace transform parameter
=
λi→j
λi→j +λj→i
[
1− e−(λi→j+λj→i)τ]
where the closed form in the last line emerges only in a 2 state model. 
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Lemma 3. Let Ti(σi) be as defined in Lemma 1. The fraction of time a driver following strategy
σ= {σ1, σ2} spends either open in state i or on a trip started in state i is
µi(σ) =
λiFi(σi)Ti(σi)Qj(σj)
λjFj(σj)Tj(σj)Qi(σi) +λiFi(σi)Ti(σi)Qj(σj)
where Qi(σi) = λi→j +λi
∫
τ∈σi
qi→j(τ)dFi(τ)
Proof. From the proof of Lemma 1, we have
µi(σ) =
pji(σj)Si(σi)
p21(σ2)S1(σ1) + p12(σ1)S2(σ2)
where Si(σi) is the expected length of the time between being open in a state i to being open again,
either after a state transition or after finishing a job; and pij(σi) is the probability that the driver is next
open in state j given she is currently open in state i. These are:
Si(σi) =
1
λiFi(σi) +λi→j
+
λiFi(σi)
λiFi(σi) +λi→j
∫
τ∈σi
τ
fi(τ)
Fi(σi)
dτ
=
1
λiFi(σi) +λi→j
[
1 +λi
∫
τ∈σi
τdFi(τ)
]
=
[
λiFi(σi)
λiFi(σi) +λi→j
]
Ti(σi)
The first part of the sum 1
λiFi(σi)+λi→j
is the expected time until either the driver receives a request that
she accepts, or the world state transitions to the other state. This form emerges because there are two
competing independent exponential clocks – that for a request and that for the world state changing. The
second part of the sum is the probability of receiving an accepted trip request before a state transition,
times the expected length of an accepted trip.
The next step is to find an expression for pij(σi), the probability that the next renewal cycle is at state j,
given the current one is at state i. We find it for j 6= i, and then pii = 1− pij .
pij(σ) =
λi→j
λiFi(σi) +λi→j
+
λiFi(σi)
λiFi(σi) +λi→j
1
Fi(σi)
∫
σi
qi→j(τ)dFi(τ)
=
[
1
λiFi(σi) +λi→j
]
Qi(σi)
The first part of the summation is the probability that the world state transitions to state j before the
driver accepts a trip request. The second part is the probability that the driver accepts a trip request
before the state transitions, times the probability qi→j(σi) =
1
Fi(σi)
∫
σi
qi→j(τ)dFi(τ) that the world will be
in state j when the driver’s trip ends. The result follows. 
A.5. Uniqueness of optimal policy for single-state model
Lemma 4. Consider the single-state model, and optimal policy σ∗ of the form σ∗ = {τ : w(τ)
τ
≥ c∗}. Then,
R(σ∗) = c∗. Further, other policies of the form σc = {τ : w(τ)τ ≥ c} are not optimal unless σc = σ∗ (up to sets
of measure 0).
Proof. By Theorem 1, there exists an optimal policy of the form σ∗ = {τ : w(τ)
τ
≥ c∗}, for some c∗. Here,
we show (1) that R(σ∗) = c∗, and (2) this is the unique optimal policy of the form σ∗ = {τ : w(τ)
τ
≥ c}.
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1. R(σ∗) = c∗. The proof is identical to lines (1), (2).
Suppose R(σ∗)> c∗. Then, consider c=R(σ∗), σc = {τ : w(τ)τ ≥ c}. If F (σ∗ \σc)> 0:
R(σc) =
λ
∫
τ∈σ∗ w(τ)dF (τ)−λ
∫
τ∈σ∗\σc w(τ)dF (τ)
1 +λ
∫
τ∈σ∗ τdF (τ)−λ
∫
τ∈σ∗\σc τdF (τ)
>R(σ∗)
Which follows from
λ
∫
τ∈σ∗\σc w(τ)dF (τ)
λ
∫
τ∈σ∗\σc τdF (τ)
< c=R(σ∗) =
λ
∫
τ∈σ∗ w(τ)dF (τ)
1+λ
∫
τ∈σ∗ τdF (τ)
, and x
z
< w
y
=⇒ w−x
y−z >
w
y
. This
contradicts that σ∗ is optimal.
Similarly, suppose R(σ∗)< c∗. Then, consider c=R(σ∗), σc = {τ : w(τ)τ ≥ c}. If F (σc \σ∗)> 0:
R(σc) =
λ
∫
τ∈σ∗ w(τ)dF (τ) +λ
∫
τ∈σc\σ∗ w(τ)dF (τ)
1 +λ
∫
τ∈σ∗ τdF (τ) +λ
∫
τ∈σc\σ∗ τdF (τ)
>R(σ∗)
Which follows from
λ
∫
τ∈σc\σ∗ w(τ)dF (τ)
λ
∫
τ∈σc\σ∗ τdF (τ)
> c=R(σ∗) =
λ
∫
τ∈σ∗ w(τ)dF (τ)
1+λ
∫
τ∈σ∗ τdF (τ)
, and x
z
> w
y
=⇒ w+x
y+z
> w
y
. This
contradicts that σ∗ is optimal.
2. Suppose there were two optimal σc1 , σc2 of the appropriate form. Without loss of generality, let c1 < c2.
Suppose F (σc1 \σc2)> 0, and so σc1 ( σc2 . By the previous part, R(σc1) = c1,R(σc2) = c2. Then
R(σc2) =
λ
∫
τ∈σc1
w(τ)dF (τ)−λ∫
τ∈σc1\σc2
w(τ)dF (τ)
1 +λ
∫
τ∈σc1
τdF (τ)−λ∫
τ∈σc1\σc2
τdF (τ)
<R(σc1)
Which follows from
λ
∫
τ∈σc1\σc2
w(τ)dF (τ)
λ
∫
τ∈σc1\σc2
τdF (τ)
> c1 =R(c1) =
λ
∫
τ∈σc1
w(τ)dF (τ)
1+λ
∫
τ∈σc1
τdF (τ)
, and x
z
> w
y
=⇒ w
y
> w−x
y−z ,
contradicting the supposition that R(σc1) = c1 < c2 =R(σc2).

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B.1. Derivatives of reward and properties in dynamic model
Here we take derivatives of the reward function R(w,σ) and its components in the dynamic model. These
will be useful in proving both the incentive compatible pricing structure and the optimal policy structure
with multiplicative or affine pricing.
Recall in the dynamic model that we constrain σi to be measurable, open, subsets of the R+. Then, σi
can be written as a countable union of disjoint subsets of R+, i.e. σi =∪∞k=0(`k, uk). We further assume that
uk 6= `m, for any k,m; we can do so without loss of generality by making a measure 0 change to σi, by
adding uk = `m to σi.
Suppose u is an upper-endpoint of σi, ie. ∃k such that u= uk. Then, we use ∂∂uH(σi) to denote the
derivative of the set function H with respect to u at σi. Similarly,
∂
∂`
H(σi) is the derivative of H at σi with
respect to a lower-endpoint of σi.
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Note that we also derive ∂
∂u
R(w,{σ1, σ2}), ∂∂`R(w,{σ1, σ2}). We will make it clear in each instance
whether u or ` is an endpoint of σ1 or σ2. For all the derivatives in this subsection
∂
∂u
refers to the
derivative with respect to an upper endpoint in σi.
Throughout, we use the ∝ symbol to denote has the same sign as. For notational convenience, for a fixed
σi, let
Qi ,Qi(σi) = λi→j +λi
∫
σi
qi→j(τ)dFi(τ)
Ti , λiFi(σi)Ti(σi) = 1 +λi
∫
τ∈σi
τdFi(τ)
Wi , λiFi(σi)Wi(σi) = λi
∫
τ∈σi
wi(τ)dFi(τ)
Then,
µi({σj , σ2}) = QjTi
QjTi +QiTj
R(w,σ) = µ1(σ)R1(w1, σ1) +µ2(σ)R2(w2, σ2)
=
[
1
Q2T1 +Q1T2
]
[Q2W1 +Q1W2]
Ri(σi) =
Wi
Ti
∂
∂u
Qi =
∂
∂u
[
λi→j +λi
∫
τ∈σi
qi→j(τ)dFi(τ)
]
= λiqi→j(u)fi(u)
∂
∂u
Wi =
∂
∂u
[
λi
∫
τ∈σi
wi(τ)dFi(τ)
]
= λiwi(u)fi(u)
∂
∂u
Ti = λifi(u)u
∂
∂u
R(w,σ) =
[
λifi(u)
QiTj +QjTi
]
[[qi→j(u)Wj +Qjwi(u)]−R(w,σ)(uQj + qi→j(u)Tj)]
∝ [qi→j(u)Wj +Qjwi(u)]−R(w,σ)(uQj + qi→j(u)Tj)
∝ [qi→j(u)Wj +Qjwi(u)] (QiTj
+QjTi)− (QiWj +QjWi)(uQj + qi→j(u)Tj)
= qi→j(u)Wj(QiTj +QjTi) +Qjwi(u)(QiTj +QjTi)
−uQj(QiWj +QjWi)− qi→j(u)Tj(QiWj +QjWi)
∝ qi→j(u)WjTi +wi(u)(QiTj +QjTi)−u(QiWj +QjWi)− qi→j(u)TjWi
= qi→j(u) [WjTi−TjWi] +wi(u)(QiTj +QjTi)−u(QiWj +QjWi)
= uTiTj
[
qi→j(u)
u
(Rj −Ri) + wi(u)
u
(
Qi
Ti
+
Qj
Tj
)
−
(
Qi
Ti
Rj +
Qj
Tj
Ri
)]
∝ qi→j(u)
u
∆ji +
wi(u)
u
(
Qi
Ti
+
Qj
Tj
)
−
(
Qi
Ti
Rj +
Qj
Tj
Ri
)
∆ji =Rj −Ri
, r(u, i,w,σ)
In other words, r(u, i,w,σ) has the same sign as the derivative of the overall reward with respect to u (an
upper endpoint of σi) at w, σ, but it is not necessarily monotonic with it.
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Remark 1. Given assumptions on Fi, wi:
• Ri(σ),R(σ), µi are continuous in σ
• ∂
∂u
R(w,σ), r(u, i,w,σ) are both continuous u (for fixed σ), and continuous in σ.
• qi→j(u)
u
is strictly decreasing in u.
• If ∆ji < 0 (i.e. i= 2 the surge state) and wi(u)u is non-decreasing in u, then r(u, i,w,σ) is strictly
increasing in u for a fixed σ. Thus, ∂
∂u
R(w,σ) is negative up to a certain point U ∈ (0,∞)∪{∞} and
then positive thereafter.
• If ∆ji > 0 (i.e. i= 1 the non-surge state) and wi(u)u is non-increasing in u, then r(u, i,w,σ) is strictly
decreasing in u for a fixed σ. Thus, ∂
∂u
R(w,σ) is positive up to a certain point U ∈ (0,∞)∪{∞} and
then negative thereafter.
• ∂
∂`
R(w,σ) at a lower endpoint of σi is just the negative of the derivative at the same place if a lower
endpoint.
Lemma 5. Suppose wi(τ) =mτ + a, where m,a> 0, and ∆ji < 0. Then, r(u, i,w,σ) is strictly
quasi-convex in u, for a fixed σ.
Proof.
r(u, i,w,σ) =
c1a− c2qi→j(u)
u
+ c3 c1, c2 ≥ 0; c3 can be negative
Then, ∂
∂u
r(u, i,w,σ)
=
∂
∂u
[
c1− c2qi→j(u)
u
+ c3
]
=
1
u2
[
−uc2 ∂
∂u
qi→j(u)− [c1− c2qi→j(u)]
]
=
1
u2
[
−uc2 ∂
∂u
[
α
α+β
[
1− e−(α+β)u]]− [c1− c2 [ α
α+β
[
1− e−(α+β)u]]]]
=
1
u2
[
−uc2
[
αe−(α+β)u
]
+ c2
[
α
α+β
[
1− e−(α+β)u]]− c1]
=
1
u2
[
−uc2
[
α
[ ∞∑
n=0
un(−1)n(α+β)n
n!
]]
+ c2
[
α
α+β
[
1−
[ ∞∑
n=0
un(−1)n(α+β)n
n!
]]]
− c1
]
=
1
u2
[
c2α
α+β
[ ∞∑
n=0
(−1)n+1un+1(α+β)n+1
n!
+ 1 +
∞∑
n=0
un(−1)n+1(α+β)n
n!
]
− c1
]
=
1
u2
[
c2α
α+β
[ ∞∑
n′=1
(−1)n′un′(α+β)n′
(n′− 1)! +
∞∑
n=1
un(−1)n+1(α+β)n
n!
]
− c1
]
n′ = n+ 1
=
1
u2
[
c2α
α+β
[ ∞∑
n=2
(−1)nun(α+β)n
[
1
(n− 1)! −
1
n!
]]
− c1
]
Where last line follows because first (n= 1) term of summation is zero.
Thus, r(u, i,w,σ) is strictly quasi-convex if c2α
α+β
[∑∞
n=2(−1)nun(α+β)n
[
1
(n−1)! − 1n!
]]
− c1 is strictly
increasing (derivative is strictly negative up to a point, and then strictly positive above that point u, for a
fixed σ.)
∂
∂u
[
c2α
α+β
[ ∞∑
n=2
(−1)nun(α+β)n
[
1
(n− 1)! −
1
n!
]]
− c1
]
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=
c2α
α+β
[ ∞∑
n=2
(−1)nun−1(α+β)n
[
n
(n− 1)! −
n
n!
]]
=
c2α
α+β
[ ∞∑
n=2
(−1)nun−1(α+β)n 1
(n− 2)!
]
=
c2α
α+β
[ ∞∑
n′=0
(−1)n′+2un′+1(α+β)n′+2 1
n′!
]
n′ = n− 2
= c2αu(α+β)
[ ∞∑
n=0
(−1)nun(α+β)n 1
n!
]
= c2αu(α+β)e
−(α+β)u > 0

Lemma 6. Suppose wi(τ) =mτ + a, where m> 0,a< 0 and ∆ji > 0. Then, r(u, i,w,σ) is strictly
quasi-concave.
Proof. Corollary of Lemma 5. r(u, i,w,σ) is the negative of the previous case, modulo constants that
do not affect quasi-concavity. 
B.2. Lemmas for Incentive Compatible policy
Remark 2.
Let wi(u) =mu+ zqi→j(u)
Then Wi =m(Ti− 1) + z(Qi−λi→j)
∂
∂u
R(w,σ)∝ qi→j(u) [(Rj −m)TjTi +mTj + zQjTi + zTjλi→j ]
+u [QiTj(m−Rj) +Qj(m− zQi + zλi→j)]
Proof.
wi(u) =mu+ zqi→j(u) m,z ≥ 0
Wi = λi
∫
τ∈σi
wi(τ)dFi(τ) = λi
∫
τ∈σi
[mτ + zqi→j(τ)]dFi(τ) =m(Ti− 1) + z(Qi−λi→j)
Then
WjTi−TjWi =RjTjTi−mTj(Ti− 1)− zTj(Qi−λi→j)
wi(u)(QiTj +QjTi) = (mu+ zqi→j(u))(QiTj +QjTi)
= qi→j(u)(zQiTj + zQjTi) +u(mQiTj +mQjTi)
∂
∂u
R(w,σ)∝ qi→j(u) [WjTi−TjWi] +wi(u)(QiTj +QjTi)−u(QiWj +QjWi)
= qi→j(u) [RjTjTi−mTj(Ti− 1)− zTj(Qi−λi→j) + zQiTj + zQjTi]
+u [mQiTj +mQjTi−QiRjTj −Qj(m(Ti− 1) + z(Qi−λi→j))]
= qi→j(u) [(Rj −m)TjTi +mTj + zQjTi + zTjλi→j ]
+u [QiTj(m−Rj) +Qj(m− zQi + zλi→j)]

Remark 3. limu→0
qi→j(u)
u
= λi→j .
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Proof. Simple application of L’Hopital’s rule.
lim
u→0
qi→j(u)
u
= lim
u→0
∂
∂u
qi→j(u) = lim
u→0
∂
∂u
λi→j
λi→j +λj→i
[
1− e−(λi→j+λj→i)u]= λi→j

Remark 4. λi→jTi−Qi ≥ 0 and maximized when σi = (0,∞). Similarly, Qi ≥ 0 and maximized when
σi = (0,∞).
Proof.
λi→jTi−Qi = λi→j
[
1 +λi
∫
τ∈σi
τdFi(τ)
]
−λi→j −λi
∫
σi
qi→j(τ)dFi(τ)
= λi
∫
τ∈σi
[λi→jτ − qi→j(τ)]dFi(τ)
λi→jτ − qi→j(τ) is increasing in τ :
∂
∂τ
[λi→jτ − qi→j(τ)] = λi→j −
[
λi→je
−(λi→j+λj→i)τ
]≥ 0
and λi→j ∗ 0− qi→j(0) = 0. Thus, the function being integrated is positive, and so λi→jTi−Qi > 0 and
maximized when σi = (0,∞). Identical proof holds for Qi.

In the next lemma, we consider u an upper endpoint of σ2, and so
∂
∂u
R(w= {w1,w2}, σ= {σ1, σ2}) is a
derivative with respect to an upper endpoint of σ2.
Lemma 7. Fix arbitrary σ1, and thus Q1, T1,R1. Let Q¯2, T¯2 be the respective values of Q2, T2 at
σ2 = (0,∞). Let w2(τ) =mτ + zq2→1(τ), where m>R1.
If
T1(λ2→1T¯2− Q¯2)− (Q1 +T1λ2→1)(
Q1(λ2→1T¯2− Q¯2) +λ2→1(Q1 +T1λ2→1)
) ≤ z
m−R1 ≤
Q¯2T1 +Q1
Q1(Q¯2−λ2→1)
Then ∂
∂u
R(w,σ)≥ 0, for all u,σ2. Furthermore, the constraint set is feasible regardless of the primitives.
Proof.
Suppose we have w2(u) =mu+ zq2→1(u), for some m>R1, z ≥ 0.
From Remark 2,
∂
∂u
R(w,σ)∝ u
[
q2→1(u)
u
[(R1−m)T1T2 +mT1 + zQ1T2 + zT1λ2→1]
]
+u [Q2T1(m−R1) +Q1(m− zQ2 + zλ2→1)]
T2,Q2 are functions of σ2.
As u→∞, the term in brackets in the first term goes to 0, and thus the first necessary condition is to
have the second term always positive.
If the second term is always positive, then the first term may be negative as long as it has a smaller
absolute value than the second term. As u→ 0, the ratio between (absolute value of) the first and second
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terms is maximized. Thus, the second necessary (and sufficient) condition is to have the entire value
positive when we take the limit of q2→1(u)
u
as u→ 0.
These two conditions are sufficient for ∂
∂u
R(w,σ)≥ 0, for all u,σ2.
From the first condition, we need m,z such that:
Q2T1(m−R1) +Q1(m− zQ2 + zλ2→1)≥ 0 ∀T1,Q1,Q2,R1
⇐⇒ z
m−R1 ≤
Q2T1 +
m
m−R1Q1
Q1(Q2−λ2→1)
From the second condition, and using Remark 3 we need:
λ2→1 [(R1−m)T1T2 +mT1 + zQ1T2 + zT1λ2→1] + [Q2T1(m−R1) +Q1(m− zQ2 + zλ2→1)]≥ 0
⇐⇒ (m−R1)T1(Q2−λ2→1T2) +m(Q1 +λ2→1T1) + zQ1(λ2→1T2−Q2 +λ2→1) + zT1λ22→1 ≥ 0
⇐⇒ z (Q1(λ2→1T2−Q2) +λ2→1(Q1 +T1λ2→1))≥ (m−R1)T1(λ2→1T2−Q2)−m(Q1 +T1λ2→1)
⇐⇒ z
m−R1 ≥
T1(λ2→1T2−Q2)− mm−R1 (Q1 +T1λ2→1)
(Q1(λ2→1T2−Q2) +λ2→1(Q1 +T1λ2→1))
Putting the conditions together, we need, for all Ti,Qi,Ri:
T1(λ2→1T2−Q2)− mm−R1 (Q1 +T1λ2→1)
(Q1(λ2→1T2−Q2) +λ2→1(Q1 +T1λ2→1)) ≤
z
m−R1 ≤
Q2T1 +
m
m−R1Q1
Q1(Q2−λ2→1)
m>R1 by supposition, and so
m
m−R1 > 1. Thus, the following is sufficient as the constraints become
tighter:
T1(λ2→1T2−Q2)− (Q1 +T1λ2→1)
(Q1(λ2→1T2−Q2) +λ2→1(Q1 +T1λ2→1)) ≤
z
m−R1 ≤
Q2T1 +Q1
Q1(Q2−λ2→1)
⇐⇒
T1− Q1+T1λ2→1(λ2→1T2−Q2)
Q1 +
λ2→1(Q1+T1λ2→1)
(λ2→1T2−Q2)
≤ z
m−R1 ≤
T1 +
Q1
Q2
Q1
(
1− λ2→1
Q2
)
It turns out that both constraints are tightest when σ2 = (0,∞). In the left constraint, the numerator is
increasing and the denominator is decreasing with λ2→1T2−Q2, and so the constraint becomes tighter as
λ2→1T2−Q2 increases. By Remark 4, λ2→1T2−Q2 is always positive, and maximized when σ2 = (0,∞).
Similarly, in the right constraint, the numerator decreases and the denominator increases with Q2.
Thus, it is sufficient for the two constraints to be feasible for σ2 = (0,∞). Then, they are satisfied for all
σ′2. For feasibility, we need
T1(λ2→1T2−Q2)− (Q1 +T1λ2→1)
(Q1(λ2→1T2−Q2) +λ2→1(Q1 +T1λ2→1)) ≤
Q2T1 +Q1
Q1(Q2−λ2→1)
⇐⇒ (T1(λ2→1T2−Q2)− (Q1 +T1λ2→1))Q1(Q2−λ2→1)
≤ (Q2T1 +Q1)(Q1(λ2→1T2−Q2) +λ2→1(Q1 +T1λ2→1))
⇐⇒ Q1Q2(T1(λ2→1T2−Q2)− (Q1 +T1λ2→1))−Q1λ2→1(T1(λ2→1T2−Q2)− (Q1 +T1λ2→1))
≤Q2T1(Q1(λ2→1T2−Q2) +λ2→1(Q1 +T1λ2→1)) +Q1(Q1(λ2→1T2−Q2) +λ2→1(Q1 +T1λ2→1))
⇐⇒ Q1Q2(− (Q1 +T1λ2→1))−Q1λ2→1(T1(λ2→1T2−Q2))
≤Q2T1(λ2→1(Q1 +T1λ2→1)) +Q1(Q1(λ2→1T2−Q2))
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For any valid Qi, Ti, the left hand side of the final line is always non-positive, and the right hand side is
always non-negative, and thus there exists feasible ratios z
m−R1 .

We can now do the same thing for the first state, assuming that w1(τ) is of the form
w1(τ) =mτ + zq1→2(τ), where now z ≤ and m=R2. In the next lemma, we consider u an upper endpoint
of σ1, and so
∂
∂u
R(w= {w1,w2}, σ= {σ1, σ2}) is a derivative with respect to an upper endpoint of σ1. Then,
Lemma 8. Fix arbitrary σ2, and thus Q2, T2,R2. Let Q¯1, T¯1 be the respective values of Q1, T1 at
σ1 = (0,∞). Let w1(τ) =mτ + zq1→2(τ), where m=R2.
If
− (T2λ1→2 +Q2)
Q2(λ1→2T¯1− Q¯1) +λ1→2(T2λ1→2 +Q2) ≤
z
R2
≤ 1
(Q¯1−λ1→2)
Then ∂
∂u
R(w,σ)≥ 0, for all u,σ1. Furthermore, the constraint set is feasible regardless of the primitives.
Proof.
Similar to previous proof. Suppose we have w1(u) =mu+ zq1→2(u), for some m=R2, z ≤ 0.
From Remark 2,
∂
∂u
R(w,σ) =u
[
q1→2(u)
u
[(R2−m)T1T2 +mT2 + zQ2T1 + zT2λ1→2]
]
+u [Q1T2(m−R2) +Q2(m− zQ1 + zλ1→2)]
=u
[
q1→2(u)
u
[R2T2 + zQ2T1 + zT2λ1→2] + [Q2(R2− zQ1 + zλ1→2)]
]
As before, we have two necessary and sufficient conditions for ∂
∂u
R(w,σ)≥ 0, for all u,σ1.
From the first condition, we need m,z such that:
Q2(R2− z(Q1−λ1→2))≥ 0 ∀T2,Q2,Q1,R2
⇐⇒ z
R2
≤ 1
(Q1−λ1→2)
This condition is trivially met when z ≤ 0.
Similarly, the second condition becomes
λ1→2 [R2T2 + zQ2T1 + zT2λ1→2] + [Q2(R2− zQ1 + zλ1→2)]≥ 0
⇐⇒ λ1→2R2T2 +Q2R2 ≥−zQ2(λ1→2T1−Q1)− zλ1→2(T2λ1→2 +Q2)
⇐⇒ z
R2
≥− (T2λ1→2 +Q2)
Q2(λ1→2T1−Q1) +λ1→2(T2λ1→2 +Q2)
Both constraints are tightest when σ1 = (0,∞). By Remark 4, λ1→2T1−Q1 is always positive, and
maximized when σ1 = (0,∞).
As one is non-negative and the other is non-positive, the constraints are feasible.

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B.3. Optimal policies as depend on derivatives
Here we prove how the optimal policies depend on the derivative of the reward function (whether they are
always positive, strictly increasing, strictly decreasing, strictly quasi-convex, or strictly quasi-concave). The
following five proofs, one for each case, are extremely similar. We start with an arbitrary open set σ′, and
then make a sequence of changes to the policy that result in a set σ of the appropriate form. The set-up in
each proof is the same; only the exact changes made to improve the policy differ. These changes depend on
the structure of the derivative of the reward with respect to the endpoints of the sets that make up the
policy, ∂
∂u
R(w,σ), ∂
∂`
R(w,σ). The idea is that as long as the derivative can be shown to be non-negative for
some u that is an endpoint of σi, that policy can be locally modified to accept more trips while not
decreasing the overall reward function.
Theorem 5. Consider a reward function R˜(σ) that maps open, measurable subsets
σ=∪∞k (`k, uk)⊆ (0,∞) to the non-negative reals, and probability measure F such that F is continuous, i.e.
f is bounded. Further consider an open subset σ′ ⊆ (0,∞). Suppose
1. F (σ′)> 0, and R˜(σ′)> R˜(∅).
2. R˜(σ) is continuous in σ.
3. Let σ=∪k(`k, uk). Then, let ∂∂u R˜(σ) denote the partial derivative of R˜ with respect to an upper
end-point uk of the intervals that make up σ. Suppose
∂
∂u
R˜(σ) exists, for all σ and its endpoints uk,
and is continuous in u for a fixed σ.
4. Further suppose that ∂
∂uk
R˜(∪m(`m, um)) is continuous in uk, i.e. ∂∂u R˜(σ) is continuous in σ.
5. Suppose ∂
∂u
R˜(σ) is always non-negative in u (for a fixed σ), for all σ.
Then, the policy σ∗ = (0,∞) such that R˜(σ∗)≥ R˜(σ′).
Proof.
We prove the result as follows: start at any arbitrary open measurable subset
σ′ ⊆ (0,∞) =∪∞k (`k, uk) =∪∞k ζk, where the intervals are disjoint and ζk = (`k, uk) denotes the kth interval.
It is well known that any open subset of R can be uniquely written as the countable union of such disjoint
intervals.
Starting with this set σ′, we create a sequence σ′δ→ σ′ (as δ→ 0), where, for each δ,
F (σ′ \σ′δ ∪σ′δ \σ′)< δ. Then, we show that there exists a σ∗ = (`∗,∞), for some `∈R+, such that
R˜(σ′δ)≤R(σ∗),∀δ. By continuity of the set function R˜, this implies that R˜(σ′)≤R(σ∗).
Sequence σ′δ. Each σ
′
δ will be of the form σ
′
δ = (0,L) (∪Kk=1(`k, uk))∪ (B,∞), for some K,B,L that
depend on δ. We construct a σ′δ such that F (σ
′ \σ′δ ∪σ′δ \σ′)< δ as follows:
• F is a finite (probability) measure, and so there exists K such that F (∪∞k=K+1(`k, uk))< δ/2. (Since
F (σ′)≤ 1, it follows by the Cauchy condition).
• Let B ∈R s.t. F ((B,∞))< δ/4. Let L∈R s.t. F ((0,L))< δ/4. Such B,L exist by condition on F .
• Set σ′δ = (0,L)∪ (∪Kk=1(`k, uk))∪ (B,∞).
Author: Driver Surge Pricing
48 Article submitted to ; manuscript no.
• For convenience, we re-index the disjoint intervals {ζk}K+2k=1 such that they are in increasing order, i.e.
uk > `k ≥ uk−1,∀k > 1, starting at (0,L), with the last interval (B,∞) If there exist any intervals such
that `k = uk−1, replace them with the combined interval (`k−1, uk). If {B,∞} overlaps with the last
interval, combine them.
Starting with this set σ′, we create a sequence σ′δ→ σ′ (as δ = 1N ,N = 1,2,3, . . . ), where, for each δ,
F (σ′ \σ′δ ∪σ′δ \σ′)< δ.
Showing that R˜(σ∗)≥ R˜(σ′), where σ∗ = (0,∞).
Now, starting at σ= σ′δ, we describe a sequence of modifications to σ, such that each modification does
not reduce the reward R˜(σ). The limit of this sequence of modifications is the policy σ∗ = (0,∞), regardless
of the starting σ′δ. This shows that R˜(σ
∗)≥ R˜(σ′δ).
Let σ=∪Kk=1(`k, uk), and note that `1 = 0 from above. By supposition that ∂∂u R˜(σ) is always
non-negative in u, we can increase u1 (merging with other intervals) without decreasing R˜(σ).
Thus, we can keep increasing u1, and u1→B, and so R((0,∞))≥R(σ′).

Theorem 6. Consider a reward function R˜(σ) that maps open, measurable subsets
σ=∪∞k (`k, uk)⊆ (0,∞) to the non-negative reals, and probability measure F such that F is continuous, i.e.
f is bounded. Further consider an open subset σ′ ⊆ (0,∞).
Suppose
1. F (σ′)> 0, and R˜(σ′)> R˜(∅).
2. R˜(σ) is continuous in σ.
3. Let σ=∪k(`k, uk). Then, let ∂∂u R˜(σ) denote the partial derivative of R˜ with respect to an upper
end-point uk of the intervals that make up σ. Suppose
∂
∂u
R˜(σ) exists, for all σ and its endpoints uk,
and is continuous in u for a fixed σ.
4. Further suppose that ∂
∂uk
R˜(∪m(`m, um)) is continuous in uk, i.e. ∂∂u R˜(σ) is continuous in σ.
5. Suppose ∃ > 0 s.t. ∂
∂u
R˜(σ) has the same sign as a function r(u,σ) that is strictly increasing in u
(for a fixed σ), for all σ such that R˜(σ)≥ R˜(σ′)− .
Then, there exists a value `∗ ∈R+ ∪{∞} such that the policy σ∗ = (`∗,∞) such that R˜(σ∗)≥ R˜(σ′).
Proof.
We prove the result as follows: start at any arbitrary open measurable subset
σ′ ⊆ (0,∞) =∪∞k (`k, uk) =∪∞k ζk, where the intervals are disjoint and ζk = (`k, uk) denotes the kth interval.
It is well known that any open subset of R can be uniquely written as the countable union of such disjoint
intervals.
Starting with this set σ′, we create a sequence σ′δ→ σ′ (as δ→ 0), where, for each δ,
F (σ′ \σ′δ ∪σ′δ \σ′)< δ. Then, we show that there exists a σ∗ = (`∗,∞), for some `∈R+, such that
R˜(σ′δ)≤R(σ∗),∀δ. By continuity of the set function R˜, this implies that R˜(σ′)≤R(σ∗).
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Sequence σ′δ. Each σ
′
δ will be of the form σ
′
δ = (∪Kk=1(`k, uk))∪ (B,∞), for some K,B that depends on δ.
We construct a σ′δ such that F (σ
′ \σ′δ ∪σ′δ \σ′)< δ as follows:
• F is a finite (probability) measure, and so there exists K such that F (∪∞k=K+1(`k, uk))< δ/2. (Since
F (σ′)≤ 1, it follows by the Cauchy condition).
• Let B ∈R s.t. F ((B,∞))< δ/2. Such a B exists by condition on F .
• For convenience, we re-index the disjoint intervals {ζk}Kk=1 such that they are in increasing order, i.e.
uk > `k ≥ uk−1,∀k > 1. If there exist any intervals such that `k = uk−1, replace them with the
combined interval (`k−1, uk). If {B,∞} overlaps with the last interval, combine them.
Use the sequence: δ = 1
N
,N = 1,2,3, . . . . As constructed, σ′δ→ σ′ as δ→ 0.
Showing that ∃`∗ such that ∃δ0 : ∀δ < δ0, R˜(σ′δ)≤ R˜((`∗,∞)).
By suppositions, ∃δ0 small enough such that r(u,σ) is strictly increasing for all σ such that R˜σ≥ R˜(σ′δ),
∀δ < δ0. Suppose δ < δ0.
Now, starting at σ= σ′δ, we describe a sequence of modifications to σ, such that each modification does
not reduce the reward R˜(σ). The limit of this sequence of modifications is a policy σ∗ = (`∗,∞), regardless
of the starting σ′δ. This shows that R˜(σ
∗)≥ R˜(σ′δ).
We continue our abuse of notation with r(`, σ) indicating a function that has the same sign as the
derivative of a lower endpoint of σi.
By the supposition that r(u,σ) strictly increasing in u, we have:
r(`, σ) strictly decreasing
r(`1, σ)≤ 0 =⇒ r(u1, σ)> 0 `1 <u1
≡ ∂
∂`1
R˜(σ)≤ 0 =⇒ ∂
∂u1
R˜(σ)> 0 xf(x)≥ 0
r(`1, σ)> 0 ⇐= r(u1, σ)≤ 0
≡ ∂
∂`1
R˜(σ)> 0 ⇐= ∂
∂u1
R˜(σ)≤ 0
Case 1: ∃ζ1, ζ2 ⊂ σ such that `2 >u1, |ζ1|, |ζ2|, i.e. there is more than one interval that makes
up σ, and ζ1, ζ2 are the first and second such intervals, respectively, with positive mass.
Then we make the following sequence of changes (forming new σ), depending on ∂
∂`1
R˜(σ), ∂
∂u1
R˜(σ):
Subcase 1A, ∂
∂u1
R˜(σ)> 0: Increase u1 until u1 = `2 (exit Case 1), or
∂
∂u1
R˜(σ)≤ 0 (go to Case 1B).
Sub-subcase 1AA, ∂
∂`1
R˜(σ)< 0, `1 > 0: Simultaneously, decrease `1.
Sub-subcase 1AB, ∂
∂`1
R˜(σ)≥ 0 or `1 = 0: Hold `1 fixed.
Subcase 1B, ∂
∂u1
R˜(σ)≤ 0 =⇒ ∂
∂`1
R˜(σ)> 0: Increase `1 until `1 = u1 (exit Case 1), or
∂
∂`1
R˜(σ)≤ 0 (which
implies ∂
∂u1
R˜(σ)> 0, i.e. go to Case 1A).
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Each of these changes cannot decrease R˜(σ), due to the direction of the changes in u1, `1 and the
corresponding derivatives (and thus the scaled gradient remains strictly increasing by supposition). Note
that these subcases are mutually-exclusive, and one is true as long as ∃ζ1, ζ2 ⊂ σ, `2 >u1. Further, note that
u1 is increasing in Subcase 1A and constant in Subcase 1B. Thus, with `2 fixed and bounded, eventually:
• `1→ u1, in Subcase 1B (i.e. the first interval collapses to mass 0). OR
• u1→ `2, in Subcase 1A (i.e. the first interval merges with the second).
Thus, this sequence of changes cannot decrease the reward, and results in there being one fewer interval
then before (after combining the bottom 2 intervals by adding the point u1 = `2 of 0 measure). Case 1 can
be iteratively applied until there is just a single interval σ= (`′,∞).
Case 2: σ= (`′,∞), i.e. there is a single interval that makes up σ
By supposition, R˜(σ′)> R˜(∅) and so R˜((`′,∞))> R˜(∅). Further R˜((`,∞)) is a continuous function in `.
Thus, there exists L such that ∀` > L, R˜((`′,∞))> R˜((`,∞)).
Thus, there exists `∗ ∈ [0,L] such that R˜((`∗,∞))≥ R˜((`,∞)),∀`∈R+ ∪{∞} (continuous functions in a
compact domain have a maximum). 
Theorem 7. Consider a reward function R˜(σ) that maps open, measurable subsets
σ=∪∞k (`k, uk)⊆ (0,∞) to the non-negative reals, and probability measure F such that F is continuous, i.e.
f is bounded. Further consider an open subset σ′ ⊆ (0,∞).
Suppose
1. F (σ′)> 0
2. R˜(σ) is continuous in σ.
3. Let ∂
∂u
R˜(σ) denote the partial derivative of R˜ with respect to an upper end-point uk of the intervals
that make up σ. Suppose ∂
∂u
R˜(σ) exists, for all σ and its endpoints uk, and is continuous in u for a
fixed σ.
4. Further suppose that ∂
∂uk
R˜(∪m(`m, um)) is continuous in uk, i.e. ∂∂u R˜(σ) is continuous in σ.
5. Suppose ∃ > 0 s.t. ∂
∂u
R˜(σ) has the same sign as a function r(u,σ) that is strictly decreasing in u
(for a fixed σ), for all σ such that R˜(σ)≥ R˜(σ′)− .
Then, there exists a value u∗ ∈ [0,∞)∪{∞} such that the policy σ∗ = (0, u∗) such that R˜(σ∗)≥ R˜(σ′).
Proof. The proof is extremely similar to that of Theorem 6.
However, we now need to modify the starting σ′ so it does not contain an interval (B,∞), and the other
cases have movement in different directions.
As before: start at any arbitrary open measurable subset σ′ ⊆ (0,∞) =∪∞k (`k, uk) =∪∞k ζk, where the
intervals are disjoint and ζk = (`k, uk) denotes the kth interval. Starting with this set σ
′, we create a
sequence σ′δ→ σ′ (as δ→ 0), where, for each δ, F (σ′ \σ′δ ∪σ′δ \σ′)< δ. Then, we show that there exists a
σ∗ = (`∗,∞), for some `∈R+, such that R˜(σ′δ)≤R(σ∗),∀δ. By continuity of the set function R˜, this implies
that R˜(σ′)≤R(σ∗).
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Sequence σ′δ. Each σ
′
δ will be of the form σ
′
δ = (0,L)∪ (∪Kk=1(`k, uk)), for some K,L that depends on δ
and `k, uk <∞. We construct a σ′δ such that F (σ′ \σ′δ ∪σ′δ \σ′)< δ as follows:
• F is a finite (probability) measure, and so there exists K such that F (∪∞k=K+1(`k, uk))< δ/2. (Since
F (σ′)≤ 1, it follows by the Cauchy condition).
• Let B ∈R s.t. F ((B,∞))< δ/2. Let L∈R s.t. F ((0,L))< δ/2. Such B,L exist by condition on F .
• Set σ′δ = (0,L)∪ (∪Kk=1(`k, uk)) \ (B,∞).
• For convenience, we re-index the disjoint intervals {ζk}K+1k=1 (or less, if some eliminated when removing
B; include (0,L) as the first interval) such that they are in increasing order, i.e. uk > `k ≥ uk−1,∀k > 1.
If there exist any intervals such that `k = uk−1, replace them with the combined interval (`k−1, uk).
Use the sequence: δ = 1
N
,N = 1,2,3, . . . . As constructed, σ′δ→ σ′ as δ→ 0.
Showing that ∃u∗ such that ∃δ0 : ∀δ < δ0, R˜(σ′δ)≤ R˜((0, u∗)).
By suppositions, ∃δ0 small enough such that r(u,σ) is strictly decreasing for all σ such that R˜σ≥ R˜(σ′δ),
∀δ < δ0. Suppose δ < δ0.
Now, starting at σ= σ′δ, we describe a sequence of modifications to σ, such that each modification does
not reduce the reward R˜(σ). The limit of this sequence of modifications is a policy σ∗ = (0, u∗), regardless
of the starting σ′δ. This shows that R˜(σ
∗)≥ R˜(σ′δ).
We continue our abuse of notation with r(`, σ) indicating a function that has the same sign as the
derivative of a lower endpoint of σi. By the supposition that r(u,σ) strictly decreasing in u, we have:
r(`, σ) strictly increasing
r(uK , σ)≥ 0 =⇒ r(`K , σ)< 0 `1 <u1
≡ ∂
∂uK
R˜(σ)≥ 0 =⇒ ∂
∂`K
R˜(σ)< 0 xf(x)≥ 0
r(uK , σ)< 0 ⇐= r(`K , σ)≥ 0
≡ ∂
∂uK
R˜(σ)< 0 ⇐= ∂
∂`K
R˜(σ)≥ 0
Case 1: ∃ζK−1, ζK ⊂ σ such that `K >uK−1, |ζK |, |ζK−1|, i.e. there is more than one interval that
makes up σ, and ζK , ζK−1 are the last two such intervals, respectively, with positive mass.
Then we make the following sequence of changes (forming new σ), depending on ∂
∂`K
R˜(σ), ∂
∂uK
R˜(σ):
Subcase 1A, ∂
∂`K
R˜(σ)< 0: Decreasing `K until `K = uK−1 (exit Case 1), or
∂
∂`K
R˜(σ)≥ 0 (go to Case 1B).
Sub-subcase 1AA, ∂
∂uK
R˜(σ)> 0: Simultaneously, increase uK .
Sub-subcase 1AB, ∂
∂uK
R˜(σ)≤ 0: Hold uK fixed.
Subcase 1B, ∂
∂`K
R˜(σ)≥ 0 =⇒ ∂
∂uK
R˜(σ)< 0: Decrease uK until uK = `K (exit Case 1), or
∂
∂uK
R˜(σ)≥ 0
(which implies ∂
∂`K
R˜(σ)< 0, i.e. go to Case 1A).
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Each of these changes cannot decrease R˜(σ), due to the direction of the changes in `K , uK and the
corresponding derivatives (and thus the scaled gradient remains strictly increasing by supposition). Note
that these subcases are mutually-exclusive, and one is true as long as ∃ such ζK , ζK−1 ⊂ σ. Further, note
that `K is decreasing in Subcase 1A and constant in Subcase 1B. Thus, eventually:
• uK→ `K , in Subcase 1B (i.e. the last interval collapses to mass 0). OR
• `K→ uK−1, in Subcase 1A (i.e. the last interval merges with the second to last).
Thus, this sequence of changes cannot decrease the reward, and results in there being one fewer interval
then before Case 1 can be iteratively applied until there is just a single interval σ= (0, u′).
Case 2: σ= (0, u′), i.e. there is a single interval that makes up σ By supposition, R˜((0, u)) is a
continuous function for u∈ [0,∞)∪{∞}. Further, ∂
∂u
R˜((0, u)) is strictly decreasing for all u such that
R˜((0, u))≥ R˜((0, u′)). If ∂
∂u
R˜((0, u))> 0,∀u, then u∗ =∞ is optimal. Otherwise if ∂
∂u
R˜((0, u))< 0∀u, then
u∗ is optimal. Otherwise ∃u∗ ∈ (0,∞) such that R˜(σ∗)≥ R˜(σ′).

Now, we show the structure of the optimal policies in the surge state when the derivative itself has the
same sign as a quasi-concave or quasi-convex function.
Theorem 8. Consider a reward function R˜(σ) that maps open, measurable subsets
σ=∪∞k (`k, uk)⊆ (0,∞) to the non-negative reals, and probability measure F such that F is continuous, i.e.
f is bounded. Further consider an open subset σ′ ⊆ (0,∞).
Suppose
1. F (σ′)> 0
2. R˜(σ) is continuous in σ.
3. Let ∂
∂u
R˜(σ) denote the partial derivative of R˜ with respect to an upper end-point uk of the intervals
that make up σ. Suppose ∂
∂u
R˜(σ) exists, for all σ and its endpoints uk, and is continuous in u for a
fixed σ.
4. Further suppose that ∂
∂uk
R˜(∪m(`m, um)) is continuous in uk, i.e. ∂∂u R˜(σ) is continuous in σ.
5. Suppose ∃ > 0 s.t. ∂
∂u
R˜(σ) has the same sign as a function r(u,σ) that is strictly quasi-convex in
u (for a fixed σ), for all σ such that R˜(σ)≥ R˜(σ′)− .
Then, there exists exist `∗, u∗ ∈R+ ∪{∞} such that the policy σ∗ = (0, `∗)∪ (u∗,∞) such that
R˜(σ∗)≥ R˜(σ′), and it is not the case that both `∗ = 0, u∗ =∞.
Proof. Proof is similar to that of Theorem 6: start at any open subset σ′ ⊆ (0,∞) =∪∞k (`k, uk).
Starting with this set σ′, we create a sequence σ′δ→ σ′ (as δ→ 0), where, for each δ,
F (σ′ \σ′δ ∪σ′δ \σ′)< δ.
Sequence σ′δ. Each σ
′
δ will be of the form σ
′
δ = (0,L) (∪Kk=1(`k, uk))∪ (B,∞), for some K,B,L that
depend on δ. We construct a σ′δ such that F (σ
′ \σ′δ ∪σ′δ \σ′)< δ as follows:
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• F is a finite (probability) measure, and so there exists K such that F (∪∞k=K+1(`k, uk))< δ/2. (Since
F (σ′)≤ 1, it follows by the Cauchy condition).
• Let B ∈R s.t. F ((B,∞))< δ/4. Let L∈R s.t. F ((0,L))< δ/4. Such B,L exist by condition on F .
• Set σ′δ = (0,L)∪ (∪Kk=1(`k, uk))∪ (B,∞).
• For convenience, we re-index the disjoint intervals {ζk}K+2k=1 such that they are in increasing order, i.e.
uk > `k ≥ uk−1,∀k > 1, starting at (0,L), with the last interval (B,∞) If there exist any intervals such
that `k = uk−1, replace them with the combined interval (`k−1, uk). If {B,∞} overlaps with the last
interval, combine them.
Then, we show that there exists a σ∗ = (0, `∗)∪ (u∗,∞), for some u∗, l∗ ∈R+, such that
R˜(σ′δ)≤R(σ∗),∀δ. By continuity of the set function R˜, this implies that R˜(σ′)≤R(σ∗).
Showing that ∃`∗, u∗ ∈R+ ∪{∞} such that ∃δ0 : ∀δ < δ0, R˜(σ′δ)≤ R˜((0, `∗)∪ (u∗,∞)).
By suppositions, ∃δ0 small enough such that r(u,σ) is strictly quasi-convex for all σ such that
R˜σ≥ R˜(σ′δ), ∀δ < δ0. Suppose δ < δ0.
Now, starting at σ= σ′δ, we describe a sequence of modifications to σ, such that each modification does
not reduce the reward R˜(σ). The limit of this sequence of modifications is the policy σ∗ = (0, `∗)∪ (u∗,∞),
regardless of the starting σ′δ. This shows that R˜(σ
∗)≥ R˜(σ′δ).
Then, let σ′δ =∪Kk=1(`k, uk), where ζk , (`k, uk).
The key step is noting that quasi-convexity of the transformed derivative implies that any σ with three
intervals ζ1, ζ2, ζ3 can be improved by eliminating the middle interval (or joining it with one of the others).
Case 1: ∃ disjoint ζ1 = (0, u1), ζ2 = (`2, u2), ζ3 = (`3, u3), s.t. |ζ1|, |ζ2|, |ζ3|> 0, i.e. σ is composed of at
least three intervals, and ζ1, ζ2, ζ3 are the first three such intervals with positive mass. (u3 may be ∞).
By supposition, the transformed derivative with respect to any of the upper end-points uk, r(uk, σ), is
strictly quasi-convex in u. Then, the transformed derivative with respect to any of the lower end-points `k,
r(`k, σ), is strictly quasi-concave in u, and further is the negative of r(u,σ) when u= `k.
Then, we have:
∂
∂u1
R˜(σ)≤ 0 and ∂
∂`3
R˜(σ)≥ 0 =⇒ ∂
∂`2
R˜(σ)> 0 and
∂
∂u2
R˜(σ)< 0
∂
∂`2
R˜(σ)≤ 0 or ∂
∂u2
R˜(σ)≥ 0 =⇒ ∂
∂u1
R˜(σ)> 0 or
∂
∂`3
R˜(σ)< 0
Then we make the following sequence of changes (forming new σ):
Subcase 1A, ∂
∂u1
R˜(σ)≤ 0 and ∂
∂`3
R˜(σ)≥ 0 =⇒ ∂
∂`2
R˜(σ)> 0 and ∂
∂u2
R˜(σ)< 0: Increase `2 and decrease u2
simultaneously until `2 = u2 (exit Case 1),
∂
∂u2
R˜(σ)≥ 0, or ∂
∂`2
R˜(σ)≤ 0 (go to 1B or 1C).
Subcase 1B, ∂
∂u1
R˜(σ)> 0: Increase u1 until u1 = `2 (exit Case 1), or
∂
∂u1
R˜(σ)≤ 0 (go to 1A or 1C)
Subcase 1C, ∂
∂`3
R˜(σ)< 0: Decrease `3 until u2 = `3 (exit Case 1), or
∂
∂`3
R˜(σ)≥ 0 (go to 1B or 1A).
Each of these changes strictly increase ˜R(σ). 1B and 1C may both be true, in which case arbitrarily decide
between them. At least one of the three subcases is true as long as the Case 1 condition holds. Thus,
eventually:
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• `2 = u2, in Subcase 1A (i.e. the middle interval collapses to mass 0). OR
• u1 = `2, in Subcase 1B (i.e. the first interval merges with the second). OR
• u2 = `3, in Subcase 1C (i.e. the third interval merges with the second).
Thus, this sequence of changes cannot decrease the reward, and result in there being one fewer interval
then before. Case 1 can be iteratively applied until there are just two intervals σ= (0, t1)∪ (t2,∞).
Case 2: σ= (0, t1)∪ (t2,∞).
By supposition, R˜(σ′)> R˜(∅) and so R˜((0, t1)∪ (t2,∞))> R˜(∅) for t1 > 0 or t2 <∞.
Further R˜((0, t1)∪ (t2,∞)) is a continuous function in t1, t2. Thus R˜((0, t1)∪ (t2,∞))→ R˜(∅) as
t1→ 0, t2→∞ together.
Further, R˜((0, t1)∪ (t2,∞))→ R˜((0,∞)) as t1→∞, regardless of how t2 behaves. Similarly, fixing t1,
R˜((0, t1)∪ (t2,∞))→ R˜((0, t1)) as t2→∞.
• If R˜((0, t1)∪ (t∗2(t1),∞)) is increasing for t1 >T1, for however t∗2(t1) behaves as a function of t1 then
R˜((0,∞))≥ R˜((0, t1)∪ (t2,∞)),∀t1 >T1, t2.
• For any fixed t1, if R˜((0, t1)∪ (t2,∞)) is increasing for t2 >T2, then
R˜((0, t1))≥ R˜((0, t1)∪ (t2,∞)),∀t2.
These limiting values eliminate the possible cases where t1 or t2 increasing to infinity, but the asymptotic
values at ∞ produce lower rewards, which would have implied that the maximum is not achieved. Thus,
either
1. ∃t∗1 ∈ (0,∞) : R˜((0, t∗1))≥ R˜((0, t1)∪ (t2,∞)),∀t1, t2
2. ∃t∗1, t∗2 ∈ [0,∞) : R˜((0, t∗1)∪ (t∗2,∞))≥ R˜((0, t1)∪ (t2,∞)),∀t1, t2

Theorem 9. Consider a reward function R˜(σ) that maps open, measurable subsets
σ=∪∞k (`k, uk)⊆ (0,∞) to the non-negative reals, and probability measure F such that F is continuous, i.e.
f is bounded. Further consider an open subset σ′ ⊆ (0,∞).
Suppose
1. F (σ′)> 0
2. R˜(σ) is continuous in σ.
3. Let ∂
∂u
R˜(σ) denote the partial derivative of R˜ with respect to an upper end-point uk of the intervals
that make up σ. Suppose ∂
∂u
R˜(σ) exists, for all σ and its endpoints uk, and is continuous in u for a
fixed σ.
4. Further suppose that ∂
∂uk
R˜(∪m(`m, um)) is continuous in uk, i.e. ∂∂u R˜(σ) is continuous in σ.
5. Suppose ∃ > 0 s.t. ∂
∂u
R˜(σ) has the same sign as a function r(u,σ) that is strictly quasi-concave in
u (for a fixed σ), for all σ such that R˜(σ)≥ R˜(σ′)− .
Then, there exists exist `∗, u∗ ∈R+ ∪{∞} such that the policy σ∗ = (`∗, u∗) such that R˜(σ∗)≥ R˜(σ′).
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Proof.
Proof is similar to that of above theorems: start at any open subset σ′ ⊆ (0,∞) =∪∞k (`k, uk).
Starting with this set σ′, we create a sequence σ′δ→ σ′ (as δ→ 0), where, for each δ,
F (σ′ \σ′δ ∪σ′δ \σ′)< δ, as above.
Then, we show that there exists a σ∗ = (0, `∗)∪ (u∗,∞), for some u∗, l∗ ∈R+, such that
R˜(σ′δ)≤R(σ∗),∀δ. By continuity of the set function R˜, this implies that R˜(σ′)≤R(σ∗).
Sequence σ′δ. Each σ
′
δ will be of the form σ
′
δ = (∪Kk=1(`k, uk)) \ (0,L) \ (B,∞), for some K,B,L that
depend on δ. We construct a σ′δ such that F (σ
′ \σ′δ ∪σ′δ \σ′)< δ as follows:
• F is a finite (probability) measure, and so there exists K such that F (∪∞k=K+1(`k, uk))< δ/2. (Since
F (σ′)≤ 1, it follows by the Cauchy condition).
• Let B ∈R s.t. F ((B,∞))< δ/4. Let L∈R s.t. F ((0,L))< δ/4. Such B,L exist by condition on F .
• Set σ′δ = (∪Kk=1(`k, uk)) \ (0,L) \ (B,∞).
• For convenience, we re-index the disjoint intervals {ζk}Kk=1 such that they are in increasing order, i.e.
uk > `k ≥ uk−1,∀k > 1. If there exist any intervals such that `k = uk−1, replace them with the
combined interval (`k−1, uk).
Showing that ∃`∗, u∗ ∈R+ ∪{∞} such that ∃δ0 : ∀δ < δ0, R˜(σ′δ)≤ R˜((`∗, u∗)).
By suppositions, ∃δ0 small enough such that r(u,σ) is strictly quasi-concave for all σ such that
R˜σ≥ R˜(σ′δ), ∀δ < δ0. Suppose δ < δ0.
Now, starting at σ= σ′δ, we describe a sequence of modifications to σ, such that each modification does
not reduce the reward R˜(σ). The limit of this sequence of modifications is the policy σ∗ = (`∗, u∗),
regardless of the starting σ′δ. This shows that R˜(σ
∗)≥ R˜(σ′δ).
Then, let σ′δ =∪Kk=1(`k, uk), where ζk , (`k, uk).
The key step is noting that quasi-concavity of the transformed derivative implies that any σ with two
intervals ζ1, ζ2 can be improved by eliminating one (or joining the two).
Case 1: ∃ disjoint ζ1 = (`1, u1), ζ2 = (`2, u2), s.t. |ζ1|, |ζ2|> 0, i.e. σ is composed of at least two
intervals with positive mass, and ζ1, ζ2 are the first two such intervals.
By supposition, the transformed derivative with respect to any of the upper end-points uk, r(uk, σ), is
strictly quasi-concave in u. Then, the transformed derivative with respect to any of the lower end-points `k,
r(`k, σ), is strictly quasi-convex in u, and further is the negative of r(u,σ) when u= `k.
Then, we have:
∂
∂`1
R˜(σ)≤ 0 and ∂
∂`2
R˜(σ)≤ 0 =⇒ ∂
∂u1
R˜(σ)> 0
∂
∂u1
R˜(σ)≤ 0 =⇒ ∂
∂`1
R˜(σ)> 0 or
∂
∂`2
R˜(σ)> 0
Then we make the following sequence of changes (forming new σ):
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Subcase 1A, ∂
∂`1
R˜(σ)≤ 0 and ∂
∂`2
R˜(σ)≤ 0 =⇒ ∂
∂u1
R˜(σ)> 0: Increase u1 until u1 = `2 (exit Case 1) or
∂
∂u1
R˜(σ)≤ 0 (go to 1B or 1C).
Subcase 1B, ∂
∂`1
R˜(σ)> 0: Increase `1 until u1 = `1 (exit Case 1), or
∂
∂`1
R˜(σ)≤ 0 (go to 1A or 1C)
Subcase 1C, ∂
∂`2
R˜(σ)> 0: Increase `2 until u2 = `2 (exit Case 1), or
∂
∂`2
R˜(σ)≤ 0 (go to 1B or 1A).
Each of these changes strictly increase R(σ). 1B and 1C may both be true, in which case arbitrarily decide
between them. At least one of the three subcases is true as long as the Case 1 condition holds. Thus,
eventually:
• `2 = u1, in Subcase 1A (i.e. the intervals combine). OR
• u1 = `1, in Subcase 1B (i.e. the first interval collapses to mass 0). OR
• u2 = `2, in Subcase 1C (i.e. the second interval collapses to mass 0).
Thus, this sequence of changes cannot decrease the reward, and result in there being one fewer interval
then before. Case 1 can be iteratively applied until there is just one interval σi = (t1, t2).
Case 2: σi = (t1, t2). Similar to the same case in the previous theorem.
Further R˜((t1, t2)) is a continuous function in t1, t2. Thus R˜((t1, t2))→ R˜(∅) as t1→ t2.
Further, R˜((t1, t2))→ R˜(∅) as t1→∞, regardless of how t2 ≥ t1 behaves. Similarly, fixing t1,
R˜((t1, t2))→ R˜((t1,∞)) as t2→∞.
• If R˜((t1, t∗2(t1))) is increasing for t1 >T1, for however t∗2(t1) behaves as a function of t1 then
R˜(∅)≥ R˜((t1, t2)),∀t1 >T1, t2.
• For any fixed t1, if R˜((t1, t2)) is increasing for t2 >T2, then R˜((t1,∞))≥ R˜((t1, t2)),∀t2 >T2.
These limiting values eliminate the possible cases where t1 or t2 increasing to infinity, but the asymptotic
values at ∞ produce lower rewards, which would have implied that the maximum is not achieved. Thus,
either
1. R˜(∅)≥ R˜((t1, t2)),∀t1, t2
2. ∃t∗1 ∈ [0,∞) : R˜((t∗1,∞))≥ R˜((t1, t2)),∀t1, t2
3. ∃t∗1, t∗2 ∈ [0,∞) : R˜(t∗1, t∗2)≥ R˜((t1, t2)),∀t1, t2

